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There is reason for grave concern about
the direction of U.S. trade policy. The bipar-
tisan, pro-trade consensus that served U.S.
economic and diplomatic interests so well for
so long collapsed during the final two years
of the Bush administration. Trade skeptics
have increased their ranks in the new
Congress, a majority of Americans perceive
trade as threatening, and grim economic
news has made the political climate inhos-
pitable to arguments in support of trade.
But restoring the pro-trade consensus
must be a priority of the Obama adminis-
tration. If the United States indulges mis-
placed fears, restrains economic freedoms,
and attempts to retreat from the global
economy, the country will suffer slower
economic growth and have greater diffi-
culty facing future economic and foreign
policy challenges.
America’s trade skepticism is largely the
product of a top-down process. Perceptions
have been shaped overwhelmingly by relent-
less political rhetoric that relies on three
myths. Congress and the media have spoken
for years about the decline of U.S. manufac-
turing as though it were fact, when the over-
whelming evidence points to a sector that,
until the onset of the current recession, was
robust and setting performance records.
Both lament the U.S. trade deficit without
attempting to convey or even understand its
causes, meaning, or implications. And both
attribute these alleged failures of policy to lax
enforcement of existing trade agreements.
President Obama should reexamine
these premises. He will find that they are
long on fallacy and short on fact. Mean-
while, the president will find it necessary to
rein in the congressional leadership’s
increasingly provocative approach to trade
policy if he is to have success repairing
America’s foreign policy credibility. 
The determination of the president to
arrest and reverse America’s misguided and
metastasizing aversion to trade could dra-
matically improve prospects for restoring
the pro-trade consensus. 
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Introduction
There is reason for grave concern about the
direction of U.S. trade policy. The bipartisan,
pro-trade consensus, which served U.S. eco-
nomic and diplomatic interests so well for so
long, collapsed during the final two years of the
Bush administration. Congressional skeptics,
who helped derail the U.S. trade agenda, have
increased their ranks in the new Congress.
And, already grim economic conditions appear
to be growing worse, making the political cli-
mate even less hospitable to arguments favor-
ing trade and globalization.
Yet, touting trade’s virtues is exactly what
President Obama and his cabinet should be
doing. For the sake of the economy and the pru-
dent exercise of foreign policy, restoring the pro-
trade consensus should be an economic and
diplomatic priority of the new administration.
U.S. consumers’ access to imported goods
extends family budgets. U.S. manufacturers’
access to imported raw materials, components,
and capital equipment helps hold down produc-
tion costs, which enables producers to pass on
savings to consumers and increase profitability
and investment. And, access of U.S. manufac-
turers, farmers, and service providers to the 95
percent of the world’s consumers that are living
outside the United States is needed to accelerate
the nation’s return to economic growth.
President Obama has expressed a desire to
repair America’s damaged credibility abroad.
But making amends for unilateralist missteps
during the Bush years will be difficult without
first challenging—and reversing—the congres-
sional leadership’s increasingly unilateralist
approach to trade. The president’s repudiation of
the “Buy American” language in the so-called
stimulus package was a commendable start. But
he must do more. Reaching out to Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela, while Congress continues
to deny Colombia—our staunchest ally in the
region—the courtesy of a vote on the long-
pending U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
will further damage America’s credibility.
Turning our backs on another long-pending
trade agreement with South Korea will be seen
as a sign of U.S. disengagement from an increas-
ingly China-centric Asia.
According to public opinion polls, American
sentiment toward international trade and glob-
alization has been souring steadily throughout
this decade. Recent surveys find Americans
believing, in historically large numbers, that free
trade leads to job losses, lower wages, higher
prices, and economic contraction. Other surveys
find that Americans believe there is more to fear
than to embrace about international trade and
globalization.
That Americans hold these views is one of
the great ironies of the early 21st century. After
all, increasing international trade and invest-
ment over the past several decades have been
catalysts for the unprecedented wealth creation
and robust economic growth experienced in the
United States and around the world. Most
Americans have been beneficiaries of sustained
U.S. economic growth. Most Americans enjoy
the fruits of international trade and globalization
every day. Most do not harbor antipathy toward
trade because they or someone they know lost a
job to foreign competitors or because of out-
sourcing. It is simply implausible that the degree
of antipathy toward trade reflected by survey
results is driven by past personal experiences or
any realistic fears about the future.
Could it be that U.S. policymakers and the
media have helped shape and reinforce these
negative attitudes? After all, anti-trade rhetoric
flows from Congress and the media into Ameri-
ca’s livingrooms via cable news—sometimes
shortly before pollsters call, seeking opinions
about trade. Those opinions are then cited by
policymakers as evidence that their own hostility
toward trade reflects the views of a worried
American public. And the vicious circle spins on.
Congress and the media have indeed been
central to the perpetuation of three myths. Both
have spoken for years about the decline of U.S.
manufacturing as though it were fact, when the
overwhelming evidence points to a sector that,
until the onset of the current recession, was
robust and setting performance records. Both
ascribe bloated significance to the U.S. trade
deficit without attempting to convey or even
understand its causes, meaning, or implications.
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And both contend that this alleged decline of
manufacturing and the rising trade deficit attest
to the Bush administration’s failure to enforce
existing trade agreements.
The media’s motive is straightforward: it is
giving its customers what they seem to want.
Frankly—and regrettably—Americans seem to
be more captivated by stories of gloom and
doom than by factual, logical arguments that
are devoid of sensational imagery. For that rea-
son, the media seem to favor the anti-trade
narrative. 
Members of Congress are motivated by the
imperative of reelection, which for the Demo-
cratic Party means doing the bidding of orga-
nized labor—a special interest that opposes
international economic engagement and allow-
ing Americans the choices that trade affords.
Meanwhile, economic nationalists from the
Republican Party see trade as a zero-sum game,
and a losing proposition from a national securi-
ty perspective. They oppose U.S. policies that
benefit potential adversaries, regardless of how
enriching those policies may be to Americans.
The Bush administration was also complic-
it—although sometimes unintentionally—in
this shaping of adverse public opinion. The very
fact that former president George W. Bush (one
of the least popular presidents in history) sup-
ported trade liberalization was reason enough
for many people to question its virtues. But
more substantively, President Bush and his trade
policy team spent too much time touting the
benefits of exports while downplaying or ignor-
ing the benefits of imports. In so doing, the
administration reinforced public misconceptions
that imports are bad and that our large trade
deficit is proof that the United States is losing at
trade.
For our part, pro-trade advocates have failed
to make a convincing and durable case for why
free trade is superior to the alternatives. The fac-
tual arguments are compelling, but tend to be
lost on a public that is more susceptible to depic-
tions of worst-case scenarios and the ill-con-
ceived policy bromides that follow. The scholar-
ship is there, but we need better salesmanship.
The authors’ intention in this paper is to
make the arguments for freer trade more acces-
sible and compelling so that the Obama admin-
istration may be more inclined to carry that
message. Restoring the pro-trade consensus in
America should be among the most impor-
tant—and least expensive—objectives of the
Obama presidency. Particularly in this time of
economic contraction, if the United States
indulges misplaced fears and attempts to retreat
from the global economy, the country will suffer
perennially slower economic growth, which
could adversely affect U.S. living standards.
Neither Democrats nor Republicans want this
to be our nation’s fate or their political legacies.
The steadfast determination of the U.S.
president to arrest and reverse America’s mis-
guided and metastasizing aversion to trade
would help restore the pro-trade consensus.
But that first requires that the president be
familiar with the lingering misperceptions and
political circumstances that have driven the
backlash against trade. Thus, the first section of
the paper provides some historical context for
that backlash. The next section exposes some
of the pervasive myths that have motivated the
backlash. The third section offers suggestions
for changing the terms of the debate. And the
fourth section lays out some objectives for the
Obama administration as it works to restore
the pro-trade consensus.
The Backlash against Trade
Not too long ago, Bush administration offi-
cials spoke optimistically about a free-trade
zone from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, and a
world free of industrial tariffs by 2015. U.S.
trade policy held promise as a tool to reduce
global trade barriers and to achieve greater eco-
nomic integration and growth.
With international solidarity strong and
good will running high in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, a new multilateral trade negoti-
ating round was launched in Doha, Qatar, under
the auspices of the World Trade Organization in
November 2001. Within nine months—and
after an eight-year lapse—Congress granted
“Fast Track” trade negotiating authority,1 or
“Trade Promotion Authority,” to the president,
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who then initiated bilateral trade talks with
dozens of countries as part of the administra-
tion’s program of “Competitive Liberalization,”
hoping that it would build momentum to spur a
relatively quick and successful conclusion to the
Doha Round.2
The administration’s efforts produced bilat-
eral and regional trade agreements with 16
countries between 2002 and 2007.3 And U.S.
exports to the 11 trading partners with free-
trade agreements that entered into force
between 2001 and 2007 grew nearly 80 percent
faster on average than did U.S. exports to the
rest of the world.4
However, it is difficult to credit Competitive
Liberalization with advancing U.S. trade-policy
objectives more broadly. After all, TPA has
expired, a Doha Round agreement remains elu-
sive, pro-trade voices in the Congress have dwin-
dled through consecutive elections, the fates of
three completed bilateral trade agreements hang
in legislative limbo, and enforcement and litiga-
tion seem to have supplanted negotiation and
cooperation as the overriding theme of trade pol-
icy in Congress. Meanwhile, major U.S. trading
partners continue to pursue their own bilateral
and regional agreements, extending advantages
to their businesses and consumers as U.S. trade
policy remains grounded.5
Although organized labor, through its influ-
ence on Democratic policymakers, is ultimately
behind the congressional backlash against trade,
it is reasonable to suggest that Competitive
Liberalization helped fan the flames of that
backlash—one that was hot during the 1990s,
went to embers in the wake of 9/11, was stoked
again in 2002, and began to rage with the elec-
tion of the 110th Congress in 2006. The tactics
of the Bush administration, and the Republican
leadership in Congress until 2006, probably
helped spawn that backlash.
In seeking support for TPA from Demo-
crats in the first place, the Bush administration
determined that it would need to capitulate to
demands that new trade agreements include
enforceable labor and environmental provi-
sions. But the administration also knew that
such demands would cripple multilateral trade
negotiations from the outset, as well as limit
options for bilateral agreements, since most
developing countries were—and remain—
adamantly opposed to their inclusion.6 At the
Singapore Ministerial Meeting of the World
Trade Organization in 1996, trade ministers
issued a declaration of support for core labor
standards while simultaneously opposing the
idea of enforceable labor standards in trade
agreements. Labor standards are promoted by
“economic growth and development fostered
by international trade and further trade liberal-
ization,” the statement read.7
Thus, the administration and the congres-
sional leadership decided to pursue a strategy
to secure enough Republican votes for trade
promotion authority without the need of
Democratic support. To win that support from
wavering Republicans in import-competing
states—and to forgo the need to make conces-
sions across the aisle—the administration
imposed steel tariffs, under Section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974, and changed the rules of
origin for certain apparel imports to favor
domestic processors.
Were steel tariffs and tightening the already
protectionist textile trade rules too high a price
to pay to avoid TPA language that mandated
enforceable labor and environmental standards?
They were certainly a high price, particularly
since the Doha Round is now hopelessly off
track and the administration ultimately capitu-
lated to the Democratic leadership’s demands
for such standards in May 2007. Protectionist
backsliding on steel and textiles helped solidify
developing-country suspicions of U.S. negotiat-
ing objectives, and it helped produce the intran-
sigent negotiating positions of the various devel-
oping-country groups in the Doha Round. But
it is also unlikely that the developing countries
would have allowed the negotiations to proceed
if enforceable labor and environmental condi-
tions had been required by Congress in the TPA
language.
Perhaps more importantly for U.S. trade pol-
icy today, the Republican leadership’s decision to
try to advance trade policy without the support
of the minority leadership ultimately alienated
important Democrats who now control the con-
gressional trade agenda. It would be naive to
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believe that the experiences of those Democrats,
as members of the minority in the 108th and
109th Congresses, didn’t color their anti-trade
moods in the 110th Congress. Perhaps their dis-
positions will change with a fellow Democrat in
the White House.
With each new trade agreement announced
or concluded under TPA between 2002 and
2007, Democrats in Congress seemed to raise
new objections. If it wasn’t specific provisions
in the agreement that bothered them, it was
the Bush administration’s alleged failure to
keep them informed of developments in the
negotiations that ruffled Democratic feathers.
If it wasn’t allegations of being kept in the dark,
it was that trade policy formulation rightfully
belonged to the legislative branch in the first
place (even though Congress delegated such
authority to the executive branch under TPA).
Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY)—now chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee
and historically a supporter of free trade—
objected to the process of the Oman FTA’s
negotiations:
Over the years, it appears more and
more that the United States Trade
Representative will deal with the
Republican leadership, but on issues
that Democrats think are important,
we have to deal with the country itself.
This is wrong. Whatever political
divisions we have in our country, we
ought to keep on this side of the flag
and not expose our differences to for-
eign nations.
. . .
Democrats may be in the minority, but
we should not be excluded from discus-
sions and negotiations with the USTR.
USTR should not send Democrats to
foreign representatives to see what we
can get in the bill, they are supposed to
be our negotiator the same way they are
the negotiators for the majority party.
That does not happen, but it should.8
That same day, Rangel voted against the
Oman FTA, and the agreement passed the
House by a slim margin of 221–205, with only
22 Democrats in support.9
Competitive Liberalization, and the eight
up-or-down votes that its fruits required from
the Congress, ensured that Democrats were
reminded frequently that their concerns were
being marginalized. They were reminded fre-
quently of the fact that President Bush was
granted TPA with the support of only 25
Democrats in the House of Representatives.
They were reminded frequently that the trade
agenda appeared to be a partisan enterprise.
And that period gave ample opportunity for
Democrats, with the encouragement of their
benefactors, to concoct new reasons to oppose
trade agreements. Opposition to trade liberal-
ization became a reflexive and reactionary policy
position, shaped predominantly by political
imperatives and devoid of compelling rationale.
Notwithstanding the partisan trade divide
that became stark between 2002 and the elec-
tion of 2006, the seeds of Democratic Party
opposition to trade liberalization were sown
earlier. From the mid-1990s forward, there
appears to have been a steady erosion of what
was once fairly broad bipartisan support for a
liberal trade agenda. Although foreign policy
hawks in the Republican Party became disen-
chanted with the pro-trade consensus—partic-
ularly as China’s economy began to emerge—
by and large the erosion is best characterized as
a fraying of the pro-trade consensus along
party lines.
Democrats Ditch the Pro-trade Consensus
Given today’s stark partisan differences over
trade policy, it is easy to forget the Democratic
Party’s enlightened past. It was the Democratic
Party that opposed—and the Republican Party
that supported—tariffs from the end of the Civil
War to World War I. President Woodrow
Wilson slashed tariffs considerably in 1913, only
to have those tariffs raised again during the
Republican administrations of the 1920s, culmi-
nating in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.
It was President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, who began to
repair the damage caused by Smoot-Hawley by
promoting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
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Act, which became law in 1934 and enabled
completion of new bilateral trade agreements. It
was President Harry Truman who presided over
America’s joining the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in 1947, and it was President
John F. Kennedy who championed expansion of
GATT, endorsing a new round of negotiations
in 1961. The “Kennedy Round” was concluded
in 1967 under the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson.
Most of the Tokyo Round, the next major
round of trade liberalization, was conducted
during the Carter administration, and signed
in 1979. And President Bill Clinton carried the
internationalist, pro-trade banner during his
administration, a period during which the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (which creat-
ed the WTO) and the North American Free
Trade Agreement were implemented and
China was granted Permanent Normal Trade
Relations status.
But during the 1990s, signs of fissure began
to emerge. The NAFTA vote in 1993 revealed
differences between the parties (though not as
pronounced as they would become). Over 70
percent of House Republicans and less than 40
percent of House Democrats voted for passage
of NAFTA. Almost four times as many Demo-
crats (156) as Republicans (43) voted against
NAFTA.10
Of the three most important trade bills con-
sidered by Congress during the 1990s, only the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act garnered the
support of a majority of House Democrats.11 In
fact, more Democrats than Republicans voted in
favor of the URAA (167 versus 121). As a pro-
portion of their respective caucuses, 65 percent
of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans
voted for passage of the URAA in 1994—a
solid majority of both parties.12 But that was the
high-water mark for congressional bipartisan-
ship on trade. Democratic support for pro-trade
legislation has never returned to that level.
In 1998, Congress rejected President Clin-
ton’s attempt to secure Fast Track authority,
which had lapsed in 1994. That rejection is often
mischaracterized as a vote to deprive a president
who was regarded with contempt by the Re-
publican majority in Congress. But a review of
the vote indicates that President Clinton’s defeat
came at the hands of his fellow Democrats. Only
29 House Democrats voted in favor of Fast
Track (14 percent of all Democratic votes), join-
ing 151 Republicans (68 percent of all Repub-
lican votes). Of the 243 votes against Fast Track,
171 (over 70 percent) were cast by Clinton’s fel-
low Democrats.13 Thus, the anti-trade stance of
the 110th Congress cannot be explained fully as
an indictment against George W. Bush, given
the post-URAA votes of the 1990s. Democrats
have been slowly drifting away from the post-
war, pro-trade consensus.
The decade ended with some ominous
developments on the trade front. In 1999, at the
biannual WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle,
the anti-globalization movement burst onto the
scene. Demonstrators took to the streets, pro-
testing international trade and globalization and
its alleged costs and unfairness, and preaching
disdain for the WTO as an institution (and
revealing their ignorance of its purpose, func-
tions, and modest authority).
Over the next few years, the sentiments
expressed during those two days in Seattle were
expressed again in cities around the world host-
ing WTO, World Bank, or International Mone-
tary Fund meetings. Thomas Friedman of the
New York Times aptly described this anti-global-
ization movement at the time as “the well-inten-
tioned but ill-informed being led around by the
ill-intentioned and well-informed.”14 Friedman,
of course, was referring to the exploitation of
youthful idealists (and run-of-the-mill vandals)
by labor unions, environmentalists, and other
organizations, in efforts to shroud their own
pecuniary, anti-trade agendas in cloaks of moral-
ity and righteousness.
And somehow, as the current decade pro-
gressed, the Democratic Party’s trade perspec-
tives came to reflect the anti-globalization
movement’s mantra that trade is exploitative
and benefits only rich corporations—at great
cost to workers and the environment. Prior to
2000, these perspectives had not been a promi-
nent feature of Democratic Party thinking on
trade. 
A comparison of the language in the official
Democratic Party Platforms in 1996 and 2008
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is instructive here. Indeed, the international
trade sections diverge at the opening sentence
and never look back. The 1996 Platform begins
with a positive view of trade and engagement
and a commitment to opening export markets
for American products: 
We believe that if we want the
American economy to continue strong
growth, we must continue to expand
trade, and not retreat from the world.
America’s markets are open to the
world, so America has a right to de-
mand that the world’s markets are open
to our products. American products are
the best in the world. When American
workers and American companies have
the chance to compete around the
world, we do not take second place.15
By 2008, the international trade section of
the Democratic Platform opens with a passage
that treats trade as the source of inequality and
“unsustainable” economic growth:
We believe that trade should strength-
en the American economy and create
more American jobs, while also laying a
foundation for democratic, equitable,
and sustainable growth around the
world. Trade has been a cornerstone of
our growth and global development but
we will not be able to sustain this
growth if it favors the few rather than
the many. We must build on the wealth
that open markets have created, and
share its benefits more equitably.16
The 1996 platform next lauds the Clinton
administration’s strong history of commitment
to bilateral and multilateral trade agreements—
including NAFTA and GATT—that expand
export markets and create American jobs: 
In the last four years, the Clinton-Gore
Administration has signed over 200
trade agreements, including NAFTA
and GATT, to open markets around the
world to American products, and create
more jobs for the people who make
them here at home. We have put in
place the most sweeping agreements to
lower foreign trade barriers of any
administration in modern American
history, including over 20 such agree-
ments with Japan alone—and Ameri-
can exports to Japan in the sectors cov-
ered by those agreements have increased
by 85 percent. All over the world, barri-
ers to American products have come
down, exports are at an all time high—
and we have created over one million
high-paying export-related jobs.
In 2008, the platform demotes trade to only
part of a broader strategy that creates “good jobs”
but emphasizes “enforcement” to close the U.S.
market to all sorts of nefarious foreign cheating.
Indeed, the only reference to a trade agreement
in the platform is in its commitment to use the
WTO as a means to fight “unfair” trade:
Trade policy must be an integral part of
an overall national economic strategy
that delivers on the promise of good
jobs at home and shared prosperity
abroad. We will enforce trade laws and
safeguard our workers, businesses and
farmers from unfair trade practices—
including currency manipulation, lax
consumer standards, illegal subsidies,
and violations of workers’ rights and
environmental standards. We must also
show leadership at the World Trade
Organization to improve transparency
and accountability, and to ensure it acts
effectively to stop countries from con-
tinuing unfair government subsidies to
foreign exporters and non-tariff barri-
ers on U.S. exports.
Finally, the 1996 platform promised a future
of more trade (along with the usual sops to
enforcement, labor and environmental standards,
product safety, and adjustment assistance):
In the next four years, we must contin-
ue to work to lower foreign trade barri-
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ers; insist that foreign companies play
by fair rules at home and abroad;
strengthen rules that protect the global
economy from fraud and dangerous
instability; advance American commer-
cial interests abroad; and ensure that
the new global economy is directly ben-
eficial to American working families.
As we work to open new markets, we
must negotiate to guarantee that all
trade agreements include standards to
protect children, workers, public safety,
and the environment. We must ensure
adequate trade adjustment assistance
and education and training programs to
help working families compete and win
in the global economy.
In 2008, the tone of the platform changed
dramatically, promising only to negotiate trade
agreements with enforceable labor and envi-
ronmental standards and committing to “stand
firm against” agreements (like President Clin-
ton’s NAFTA) that are implied to be responsi-
ble for a litany of awful things:
We need tougher negotiators on our
side of the table—to strike bargains
that are good not just for Wall Street,
but also for Main Street. We will nego-
tiate free trade agreements that open
markets to U.S. exports and include
enforceable international labor and
environmental standards; we pledge to
enforce those standards consistently
and fairly. We will not negotiate free
trade agreements that stop the govern-
ment from protecting the environ-
ment, food safety or the health of its
citizens, give greater rights to foreign
investors than to U.S. investors, require
the privatization of our vital public ser-
vices, or prevent developing country
governments from adopting humani-
tarian licensing policies to improve
access to life-saving medications. We
will stand firm against agreements that
fail to live up to these important
benchmarks. 
As such, the Democratic Party Platform in
2008 is difficult to distinguish from the anti-
globalization movement’s views on trade, in-
equality, labor, and the environment.
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in bipartisan-
ship on trade matters. Only 35 percent of Demo-
cratic members voted for Permanent Normal
Trade Relations with China in 2000, as compared
to 73 percent of Republicans.17 Only 12 percent
of House Democrats voted to grant Trade
Promotion Authority to President Bush in 2002,
as compared to 87 percent of Republicans.18 In
2003, about 37 percent of House Democrats
voted for the U.S. trade agreements with Chile
and Singapore, whereas 87 percent and 88 per-
cent of Republicans voted for those agreements,
respectively.19 In 2004, agreements with Morocco
and Australia both passed the Congress with
majority support in both parties. Opposition to
those agreements by traditional Democratic Party
benefactors was more muted than usual.
But in 2005, partisan battle lines were
redrawn over the Dominican Republic–Central
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA);
just 15 House Democrats (7 percent of all
Democrats) voted for DR-CAFTA, which
passed by only two votes.20 And the U.S.-Oman
Free Trade Agreement, which passed Congress
in 2006, attracted support from less than 12 per-
cent (23) of House Democrats.21
Public Sentiment Follows the Political
Rhetoric
During the final two years of the Bush
administration—a period coinciding with the
return of Congress to Democratic Party con-
trol—once-giddy expectations for comprehen-
sive international trade liberalization yielded to
the realization that free trade has its committed
opponents who are intent on halting—if not
reversing—60 years of trade expansion.
In 2007, TPA expired and serious efforts to
extend or renew that historically crucial tool of
trade diplomacy never materialized. Progress in
the multilateral Doha Round also remained
elusive. And completed bilateral trade agree-
ments with Colombia, Panama, and South
Korea were shunted aside by a Congress seem-
ingly more interested in trade enforcement and
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prosecution than in commerce and negotia-
tion. Dozens of pieces of anti-trade legislation
were introduced in the 110th Congress.22
Perhaps most indicative of the new dispen-
sation in Washington was the so-called “New
Trade Policy for America” put forth by the
Democratic trade leadership in May 2007. The
document was a Democratic Party manifesto
elevating enforceable labor and environmental
standards in trade agreements to priority sta-
tus, just ahead of “stand[ing] up for American
workers, farmers, and businesses, especially in
the hard-hit U.S. manufacturing sector.”23 The
concept of opening foreign markets to create
new opportunities for U.S. workers, farmers,
and businesses (traditionally the first priority of
trade policy) was even further down the list.
From this document was negotiated a “Grand
Bargain” on trade, under which Democrats
vowed support for the pending bilateral trade
agreements, provided those agreements be
reopened to include enforceable environmental
provisions and more stringent, enforceable labor
conditions. Of course, the agreements had al-
ready been negotiated and concluded pursuant to
the TPA language from 2002, which required
that our trade partners enforce, and not degrade,
their existing labor laws.
Nevertheless, the Bush administration agreed
to those conditions and our trade partners who
were vested heavily in the agreements’ success
had no real choice but to reopen the agreements.
The required language was inserted, and eventu-
ally the Peru agreement was passed. However,
after all that, new objections were raised to the
other three agreements.24
About the Colombia agreement, House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Chairman Rangel
issued a statement in April 2008—almost a full
year after the “Grand Bargain”—that read: “De-
spite progress made by [Colombian] President
Uribe, Colombia remains a dangerous place to be
9
Figure 1
Trade Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives, Percent of Respective Party Voting in Favor
Source: Compiled from tabulation of House voting records, http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.html.
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a labor activist, and for those who commit these
acts of violence, there is little threat of prosecution
or punishment. Sustained progress on the ground
remains a prerequisite for our support [for the
trade agreement].”25 That excuse was echoed by
then-presidential candidate Barack Obama in the
final presidential debate, as he explained his own
opposition to the agreement.26 Hopefully, as pres-
ident, Obama will heed the facts about what has
been happening in Colombia and shed this
abused, anachronistic excuse for rebuking a cru-
cial U.S. ally in South America.27
Spearheading the post-“Grand Bargain”
opposition to consideration of the U.S.-Korea
agreement has been House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade chairman Rep. Sander
Levin (D-MI). Levin’s opposition is predicated
on the agreement’s failure to incorporate an
absurd proposal that he, Chairman Rangel, and
13 other members—mostly from Michigan—
foisted upon the U.S. trade representative in the
waning weeks of the negotiations. Chairman
Levin insists that the agreement be revised to
condition-improved Korean access to the U.S.
auto market on the success of U.S. auto sales in
Korea. Hence, in a given year, if U.S. auto pro-
ducers sell 10,000 more cars in Korea than in the
previous year, then Korean producers would get
duty-free access to the United States for 10,000
more cars in the following year. Only after
American sales success in Korea had been
demonstrated would the U.S. market be opened
further to Korean autos. In other words, Korean
producers’ access to the U.S. market would be
determined by the sales objectives of the U.S.
producers. By electing to sell nothing in Korea,
the U.S. producers would preempt any duty-free
Korean sales in the United States. 
To Levin and the other architects of the
proposal, the fact that Korea’s auto market has
been notoriously tough to penetrate renders
Koreans untrustworthy enough to warrant per-
petual probationary treatment. But that char-
acterization is all part of an elaborate smoke-
screen for sinking the agreement unless its
terms favor the U.S. auto industry. In this case,
U.S. auto producers would dictate whether and
to what extent they have Korean competition
in the United States by whether and to what
extent they try to sell in Korea. It’s a “heads I
win, tails you lose” proposition for Detroit. It’s
a losing proposition for everyone else—espe-
cially consumers.
Beyond the refusal to consider completed
trade agreements, members of the 110th Con-
gress introduced a few dozen bills, objectively
characterized as antagonistic of U.S. trade part-
ners, including legislation that makes enforce-
ment of trade agreements systematic and manda-
tory;28 lowers the current evidentiary thresholds
for imposing anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and
China-specific safeguard duties;29 establishes a
panel of retired federal judges to review adverse
WTO decisions and advise Congress on the pro-
priety of those decisions before any steps toward
compliance are undertaken;30 forbids the United
States from entering into any new trade agree-
ments;31 revokes China’s “normal trade relations”
status;32 defines and treats currency manipulation
as a “countervailable” subsidy;33 requires the pres-
ident to pursue concrete measures to achieve
greater trade balance with countries that have
persistent trade surpluses with the United
States;34 and, expands trade adjustment assistance
programs to cover people who have allegedly lost
jobs in the services sectors because of outsourc-
ing.35 Implicit in all of this legislation: trade liber-
alization is bad, U.S. trade partners cheat, and the
folly of America’s embrace of globalization is evi-
denced by its massive human toll.
To complement the legislation there has
been an orgy of political rhetoric. For two years,
anti-trade rhetoric spewed from the halls of the
110th Congress and onto the 2008 presidential
campaign trail, helping spook Americans about
trade and globalization. And it has taken a toll
on the public psyche. The results of several dif-
ferent opinion polls support the conclusion that
public wariness about trade increased through-
out the decade. The same Gallup Poll question
asked in five different opinion surveys between
February 2002 and February 2008, reveals a
sharp decline in favorable public sentiment
toward trade. It asks: 
What do you think foreign trade
means for America? Do you see for-
eign trade more as an opportunity for
10
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economic growth through increased
U.S. exports, or a threat to the econo-
my from foreign imports?
In 2002, a 52 percent majority viewed trade
as an opportunity, while 39 percent viewed trade
as a threat. In each successive poll, the percent-
age viewing trade as an opportunity decreased
and the percentage seeing trade as a threat
increased. By 2008, the tables had turned entire-
ly, with 51 percent seeing trade as a threat and
only 40 percent seeing it as an opportunity.36 It
is worth noting, however, that even Gallup poll-
sters have succumbed to the “exports good,
imports bad” fallacy. The phrasing of the ques-
tion steers the respondent toward the negative
response. The question associates exports with
“opportunity” and imports with “threat” (even
though rising imports are empirically associated
with economic growth). The most commonly
referenced trade statistic in America is the trade
balance, which is published on a monthly basis
by the Commerce Department. Is it possible,
then, that the increase in unfavorable responses
simply reflects the fact that the trade deficit
increased between 2002 and 2008?
A long-running Pew Research Center survey
question asks respondents whether they think
the impact of trade agreements on the country is
a “good thing” or a “bad thing.” In six surveys
dating back to September 1997, the percentage
of people choosing “bad thing” ranged from 29
percent in September 2001 to 35 percent in
December 2006. In the April 2008 poll, that fig-
ure shot up to 48 percent and was 13 percentage
points higher than the figure for those people
indicating it is a “good thing.”37 Could that spike
have something to do with the heated presiden-
tial campaign, which filled the airwaves and
television channels with anti-trade rhetoric dur-
ing the debates? It was at the end of February
2008, during a debate at Cleveland State
University on the eve of the Ohio primary, that
the late Tim Russert extracted renunciations of
NAFTA and promises to reopen the agreement
from both Democratic candidates, Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama. Those exchanges
kept trade issues in the news cycle for the dura-
tion of the primary election campaigns.
Congress often cites this growing antipathy
toward trade as justification for its strident
rhetoric and provocative proposals. In introduc-
ing the Trade Enforcement Act of 2008, Chair-
man Rangel offered:
The American public is skeptical
about U.S. trade policy in part because
the public does not believe that our
trading partners are playing by the
same rules as the United States. Our
trading partners need to open their
markets to U.S. exporters. They need
to stop providing trade-distorting sub-
sidies, and to stop dumping their
products in our market. They need to
protect intellectual property rights,
and they need to ensure that their
exports to the United States are safe.
The Trade Enforcement Act of 2008
will help to regain confidence in U.S.
trade policy.38
Subcommittee Chairman Levin added:
For international trade to work for U.S.
workers, farmers and businesses, we
must be sure that trade is a two way
street. We need to start enforcing the
agreements that have been reached,
rather than passively accepting their
breach. We need a more assertive ap-
proach to the enforcement of our inter-
national agreements and trade laws.
The Trade Enforcement Act of 2008 is
a major step in the right direction.39
It is grossly misleading—but increasingly
par for the course—for the two highest-rank-
ing members of the House of Representatives
on matters of trade to concoct a feeble excuse
for U.S. protectionism by implying that foreign
markets are closed to U.S. exports when, in
fact, U.S. exports have been setting new records
year after year. Chairman Rangel states that the
American public is skeptical about trade with-
out noting the irony of his own role in perpet-
uating that skepticism. The backlash against
trade is demonstrably a top-down, rather than
11
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a bottom-up, phenomenon. Trade has been
demonized because important political inter-
ests want it curbed, and because politicians can
exploit the public’s naivete about the topic.
The actions and rhetoric of the 110th
Congress have signaled to the world that U.S.
trade policy is at a crossroads. It is difficult not
to conclude that the post-WWII preference for
engagement, negotiation, and cooperation
between the United States and other nations is
yielding to a burgeoning desire for isolation,
litigation, and enforcement. That conclusion is
particularly troubling considering how essen-
tial America’s global engagement has been to
U.S. and world economic growth during the
past 60 years. It would be irresponsible of
Congress and the new president to pretend
that this change in attitude toward trade is dri-
ven by facts and logic, rather than the worst
kind of political maneuvering.
President Obama famously said there is nei-
ther a Red America nor a Blue America, only
the United States of America. Anti-trade dem-
agoguery tends to hail from the far left and far
right of the traditional political spectrum. The
president has stated that he intends to govern
from the center. Most of President Obama’s
cabinet and adviser appointees in the economic
sphere seem to have centrist sensibilities. And
freer trade has been the policy objective of the
moderate center through Democratic and
Republican administrations and Congresses
since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934.
Hopefully, President Obama will be more
successful than his predecessor at convincing
Congress that trade bashing is destructive and
wrongheaded. Hopefully, he will see the light
and do his vital part to restore the bipartisan,
pro-trade consensus.
Exposing the Myths
that Malign Trade
That trade and, more broadly, U.S. engage-
ment in the global economy have been so badly
maligned is one of the great ironies of the early
21st century. After all, during the past quarter
century (between 1983 and 2007), as the value
of U.S. trade increased more than five-fold in
real terms, U.S. employers added 46 million
jobs to payrolls and real GDP more than dou-
bled to $14.5 trillion.40
Most Americans enjoy the fruits of interna-
tional trade and globalization every day: dri-
ving to work in vehicles containing at least
some foreign content; talking on foreign-made
mobile telephones; having extra disposable
income because retailers like Wal-Mart, Best
Buy, and Home Depot are able to pass on cost
savings made possible by their own access to
thousands of foreign producers; eating healthi-
er because they now can enjoy fresh imported
produce that was once unavailable out-of-sea-
son; paying lower mortgages on account of the
availability of foreign capital in the lending
market; depositing bigger paychecks on ac-
count of their employers’ growing sales to cus-
tomers abroad; and enjoying health or vacation
benefits provided by an employer that happens
to be a foreign-owned company.
It is simply implausible that the degree of
antipathy toward trade reflected in opinion
polls is driven by past personal experiences or
realistic fears about the future. The overwhelm-
ing majority of Americans have not lost jobs to
import competition or outsourcing, nor do they
know someone who has. Less than 3 percent of
U.S. job loss is attributable to import competi-
tion or outsourcing.41 Nevertheless, surveys in-
dicate that Americans, by large margins, fear
rather than embrace trade and globalization.
So this all raises a crucial question: Why?
Why have Americans grown so skeptical and
fearful of trade and globalization? Could it have
something to do with the fact that they are bar-
raged routinely with reports from the media,
campaigning politicians, and from Congress
that trade is a scourge that threatens their jobs
and their futures? These tales usually rely on one
or more of three prominent myths.
Myth 1: Manufacturing Is in Decline . . . and
Trade Is to Blame
A popular refrain heard on cable news
channels, from members of Congress, and dur-
ing the 2008 presidential campaign is that U.S.
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manufacturing is in decline and that trade and
globalization are to blame. Unfair import com-
petition, closed foreign markets, and “Benedict
Arnold” corporations that outsource or use off-
shore production have caused deindustrializa-
tion and manufacturing job loss in the United
States. 
Consider the following quote from Sen.
Sherrod Brown (D-OH), a long-time oppo-
nent of globalization and free trade:
Having lost more than 3 million man-
ufacturing jobs since 2000, it is impera-
tive that U.S. trade negotiators rigor-
ously defend our trade laws. Strong
trade laws ensure there is a level playing
field for our farmers and workers. . . . If
our trading partners seek any weaken-
ing of these trade laws, they should
understand it will be met with steadfast
opposition in Congress.42
As with most political speeches about man-
ufacturing and trade these days, Sen. Brown
relies on the “assumptive close” to guide his
audience around a debatable proposition and
straight to his solution. The assumptive close is
a psychological technique commonly used by
sales people to get you to agree to something to
which you’re not prepared to agree. You’re
asked: “What color sedan will you be buying?”
before you’ve even decided that you’re going to
buy a car in the first place, or “Shall I hold that
dress at the counter for you, while you find
matching accessories?” before you’re even sure
the dress is for you.
The myth of U.S. manufacturing decline has
been sold to the public with a classic assumptive
close. Before sparing even a moment to assess
the premise that manufacturing is in decline, the
assertion is inoculated from close scrutiny by
shifting attention to the follow-up: that trade is
to blame for the condition of manufacturing.
After all, Americans are aware that imports are
more ubiquitous today than in the past, and that
products bearing the “Made in America” label
are harder to find in retail stores. So if people are
aware their shopping carts contain imports, they
should just assume those imports have come at
the expense of—or caused a “decline” in—U.S.
manufacturing. 
The success that trade’s detractors have had in
smothering an honest dialogue about the condi-
tion of U.S. manufacturing has kept the myth of
manufacturing decline alive. In the process, those
detractors have inflicted damage on Americans’
confidence in their country’s future, raised undue
fears about trade, and helped perpetuate a divi-
sive and highly misleading narrative about Main
Street versus Wall Street.
According to nearly every financial statistic
that is relevant to evaluating the health of the
manufacturing sector, it was unequivocally
thriving until the onset of the recent U.S. finan-
cial crisis and recession. In 2006, U.S. manufac-
turing achieved record highs for output, rev-
enues, profits, investment returns, exports, and
imports.43 Yes, imports. In fact, U.S. producers
accounted for at least 55 percent of U.S. import
value in 2006 and 2007.44 And not just by coin-
cidence: in 2007 new records were set for out-
put, revenues, value added, and exports in the
manufacturing sector.45 Profits and return on
investment tailed off in 2007 because of the ris-
ing costs of commodities and transportation.
According to economists at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, in December
2007 the U.S. economy slipped into recession
and the manufacturing sector has not been
spared. Like other sectors of the economy, man-
ufacturing value added has contracted, and sales,
profits, and return on investment have suffered.
But it is important to make this crucial distinc-
tion: manufacturing is suffering a cyclical down-
turn, not a structural shift reflecting deindustrial-
ization. 
The U.S. and global economic slowdown—
and not import competition or outsourcing—
explains the 2008 contraction in American
manufacturing. Manufacturing performance
records were achieved in 2006 and 2007, amid
record-high imports. Manufacturing contract-
ed throughout 2008, as imports began a steep
decline after July. Thus import penetration did
not cause the U.S. manufacturing sector’s prob-
lems in 2008. Moreover, trade skeptics like
Sen. Brown have been lamenting manufactur-
ing’s demise for several years now, even during
13
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years when output and operating performance
were setting new record highs.
It is true that there are fewer workers in the
manufacturing sector today than in years past.
But manufacturing employment peaked in
1979 and started to decline well before trade
accounted for even a fraction of GDP. Strong
productivity gains and the continuing shift of
the U.S. economy toward services explain the
decline in manufacturing employment. 
Between 1979 and 2007 the number of U.S.
manufacturing jobs declined from 19.4 million
to 13.9 million, or by 196,429 per year. In the
14 years between 1979 and the launch of
NAFTA, the U.S. manufacturing sector shed
2.7 million jobs. In the 14 years between the
launch of NAFTA and 2007, the sector shed an
almost identical 2.8 million jobs. During the
manufacturing recession period that encom-
passed months during 2000–2003, the rate of
job decline increased five-fold to 933,333 per
year. But from 2004 to 2007, the decline was
only 100,000 per year. In other words, the peri-
od of steep employment declines ended six
years ago and, despite unrelenting political
rhetoric to the contrary, the rate of job attrition
in manufacturing remained well below the 28-
year average from 2004 through 2007.46
Trade critics like to attribute the decline in
manufacturing employment to competition
from producers who have shuttered operations
in the United States to relocate abroad, where
they have the unfair advantage of access to low-
wage workers and lax business operating stan-
dards. But that is a far-fetched proposition. 
For starters, it is incomplete and misleading
to speak of the “advantages” held by foreign-
based producers in the realm of international
competition without speaking of the advan-
tages held by American-based producers. Sure,
lower wages abroad can serve as an incentive to
off-shore manufacturing or to outsource ser-
vices functions, but wages are neither the
only—nor the most important—consideration
in these production/investment decisions. If
wage differentials were determinative, there
would be very little manufacturing or services
activities in the United States. It would all be
gone.
Instead, we see large and increasing foreign
direct investment flowing into the U.S. industri-
al base year after year. Why is ThyssenKrupp
building a $3.7 billion green field steel produc-
tion facility in Alabama?47 Why do foreign
nameplate automakers continue to invest in U.S.
manufacturing facilities?48 Why do the 5.3 mil-
lion Americans employed by U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign-owned companies earn on average 32
percent higher compensation than workers at
U.S.-owned companies?49 Because there is no
race to the bottom in pursuit of lower wages and
lax standards, as some suggest. Rather, there is a
race to the top—for skilled workers, for access to
production facilities closer to markets, for
investment in countries where the rule of law is
clear and abided, where there is greater pre-
dictability to the business climate, where tax
rates are more favorable, where the specter of
asset expropriation is negligible, where physical
and administrative infrastructure is in good
shape, and so on. Labor costs are but one of a
multitude of considerations driving investment
decisions. With respect to virtually all of the
other factors, the United States fares extremely
well relative to most other countries.
Indeed, a recent study by McKinsey &
Company found that in 2008 rising oil prices,
the declining value of the U.S. dollar, and logis-
tics concerns, among others, could cause many
investors to rethink off-shoring strategies and
even to consider “re-shoring” manufacturing
facilities in the United States.50The study makes
clear that sourcing decisions require a complex
calculation in which labor costs are one of many
factors.
The manufacturing sector’s declining share
of total U.S. gross domestic product is often
cited as evidence of deindustrialization. But the
sector’s share of the economy peaked in 1953
and also started to decline long before trade
accounted for little more than a rounding error
in the calculation of GDP. 
Relative to the value of our total economy,
manufacturing has declined on account of
growing output from our burgeoning services
sector. But in absolute terms, manufacturing
output typically sets new records year after
year. In fact, in the 48 years between 1959 (the
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first year in Table B-51 of the 2009 Economic
Report of the President) and 2007 (the last full
year of the report), manufacturing output
exceeded the previous year’s output 42 times.51
In 2007, manufacturing output was at an all-
time high, breaking the record set in 2006—
which broke the record from 2005.
In the past quarter century, annual manu-
facturing output contracted just twice—during
the recessions of 1991 and 2001. Where’s the
deindustrialization in those figures? Official
figures for 2008, when they are released, may
very well show a contraction in manufacturing
output. But like the previous six contractions
over the last half-century, it will reflect a cycli-
cal downturn from which the manufacturing
sector will recover. 
Another common misperception encour-
aged by the shallow political discourse on this
topic is that we don’t make anything anymore—
that everything on the store shelves is made in
China; that the Chinese are “eating our lunch.”
Certainly, foreign-made goods have a much
greater presence in retail stores than they once
had. In fact, many of the product categories that
Americans purchase in retail establishments—
clothing, electronics, tools, housewares, furni-
ture—are all dominated by foreign producers
nowadays. So what?
Consumers are more likely to see “Made in
China” or “Made in Vietnam” than they are like-
ly to see “Made in the U.S.A.” But that doesn’t
mean U.S. producers don’t make anything any-
more. American factories make lots of things,
and in particular, higher-value products that
aren’t typically sold in retail stores—like air-
planes, advanced medical devices, sophisticated
machinery, and biotechnology products. Figure
2 provides a glimpse of the changing composi-
tion of U.S. manufacturing since the 1940s. As
the steel and textile industries have diminished
in terms of their relative contribution to overall
manufacturing value added, more sophisticated
and less labor-intensive industries have become
more meaningful. 
In fact, American factories are the world’s
most prolific, accounting for over 25 percent of
the world’s manufacturing value added in
2006.52 China accounted for about 10.6 per-
cent.53 Thus, for every dollar of output coming
from Chinese factories, U.S. factories produce
almost $2.50. The main reason for continued
American industrial preeminence is that the
U.S. manufacturing sector has continued its
transition away from labor-intensive industries
toward higher value-added production. It is the
value of production that matters. It is the value
of output that determines the size of the econ-
omy, not whether producers make highly visi-
ble consumer goods. And, contrary to the
rhetoric, it is not how many workers a produc-
er employs that matters, but really how few, or
put differently, how productive each is. If 10
workers are required to produce $1,000 worth
of output, then each worker (all things equal)
accounts for an average $100 of output and,
assuming a simple example, an average $100 of
income. But if five workers can produce that
same $1,000 worth of output, not only do
incomes rise to $200 for those workers, but
there are now five additional workers who are
free to add value in some other endeavor. It is
the freed-up capacity of those five workers—
when applied elsewhere in the economy—that
fuels economic growth.
If it wasn’t the value of output that mat-
tered, but was instead its physical weight, then
one could reasonably assert that Chinese pro-
ducers dominate world manufacturing. But it is
value that matters, and U.S. factories produce
more value than factories in any other country. 
U.S. manufacturing has ceded most of its
lower value-added production to other coun-
tries, which has enabled it to ascend the value
chain to focus on the next generation of
machinery, instruments, chemicals, and biotech-
nology applications, while U.S. consumers have
been afforded greater variety and better prices
for everyday products. If that process were stunt-
ed, if American manufacturers were forced to
devote resources to the production of goods of
yesteryear—toys, clothes, hand tools, mass-pro-
duced furniture—then our ascent up the value
chain would be retarded and our rising stan-
dards of living threatened.
The capacity to pioneer the manufacturing
frontier is crucial to the health of American
manufacturing and the health of the broader
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economy because new innovations create rev-
enues for U.S.-based producers (exclusively for
a period of time), and spur the creation of new
jobs in the manufacturing and the services sec-
tors that transport, market, advertise, retail, and
engineer those new innovations. An open trad-
ing system facilitates this process: access to
export markets increases revenue potential and
creates economies of scale for U.S. producers,
while access to imported raw materials reduces
the cost of production, enables Americans to
buy and save more, and provides foreigners
with the resources to purchase U.S. exports.
The assertion that U.S. manufacturing is in
decline is an enduring myth—perpetuated by
politicians and the media. In fact, the complete
opposite is true. U.S. manufacturing has been
thriving. And it has been thriving, in large
measure, because of trade. Access to foreign
markets for export sales and access to foreign
suppliers for U.S. manufacturing inputs are
important parts of the manufacturing sector’s
success story.
Myth 2: The Trade Balance Is the Scoreboard 
The second pervasive myth is that exports
are good, imports are bad, and the trade
account is the scoreboard. According to this
perspective, the large U.S. trade deficit con-
firms that the United States is losing at trade.
16
Figure 2
Changing Composition of U.S. Manufacturing Value Added by Select Industry Groups (as % of Manufacturing
Value Added) 1947–2007 by Decade Average
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by Industry Data, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
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Consider the following quote from TV’s loud-
est trade skeptic, CNN’s Lou Dobbs, at a 2007
congressional hearing on U.S. trade policy:
The United States has sustained 31
consecutive years of trade deficits, and
those deficits have reached successive-
ly higher records in each of the past
five years. The trade deficit has more
than doubled since President George
W. Bush took office. The U.S. trade
deficit has been a drag on our eco-
nomic growth in 18 of the 24 quarters
of George W. Bush’s presidency.
The current account deficit in 2006
reached almost $857 billion, also a
new record, and now represents 6.5
percent of our total GDP. Since 1994,
the first full year in which the North
American Free Trade Agreement was
in effect, the United States has accu-
mulated more than $5 trillion in exter-
nal or trade debt. . . . 
As I’ve already pointed out, free trade
has been the most expensive trade pol-
icy this nation has ever pursued. There
is nothing free about ever-larger trade
deficits, mounting trade debts and the
loss of millions of good-paying Ameri-
can jobs.54
But Dobbs is confused. His indictment of
trade policy is impossible to link to the trade
balance because the trade account is not a func-
tion of trade policy. Trade imbalances reflect
disparate patterns of saving and consumption
in different countries, which are functions, to
some degree, of monetary policy, fiscal policy,
faith in public institutions (like banks, markets,
and the justice system), culture, and degrees of
confidence about what the future may hold,
among other things.
It is easy to understand why Dobbs and
many other Americans are confused about
these matters. After all, the fallacy is reinforced,
often unknowingly, by policymakers who pur-
port to champion open trade. President Bush
and his trade policy team frequently reinforced
these misconceptions. The former U.S. trade
representative Susan Schwab liked to speak of
the fact that the United States was running a
trade surplus with the dozen or so countries
with whom free-trade agreements were imple-
mented during the Bush years. Implicit in her
selling point was that trade surpluses are an
unequivocally good thing and that maximizing
exports and minimizing imports are worthy
objectives. Well, if net exports are the metric by
which to measure success, then it does not
require a sophisticated analysis to conclude
that, with a $700–$800 billion aggregate trade
deficit, overall U.S. trade policy is an abject fail-
ure. But that would be wrong—or at least
impossible to conclude from those data.
The Chinese have been big savers through-
out their process of economic liberalization,
which began in 1978. Americans, on the other
hand, have tended not to save very much.
Some might want to chalk that up to American
profligacy or evidence of declining industrious-
ness and virtue, but the fact is that one of the
reasons for low U.S. savings rates is that for-
eigners have traditionally preferred investing in
the United States over other economies. The
availability of foreign capital has helped drive
U.S. business expansion as well as helped tip
the balance in favor of spending over saving for
many Americans. Relatively low interest rates
have made spending more affordable and sav-
ing less prudent.
Foreign investment in U.S. real estate, facto-
ries, equities, and government debt—all
reflected in the large U.S. capital account sur-
plus—helps explain low U.S. saving rates. The
surplus of foreign capital (which mirrors the
deficit in the current account) has kept U.S.
interest rates low, and interest rates are the cost
of current spending vis-à-vis saving. When
interest rates fall, the cost of spending versus
saving also falls.
It is these differences between the United
States and other countries in levels of con-
sumption and saving that explain the current
large U.S. account deficit and the equally large
capital account surplus. Neither is much a
function of trade policy.
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Second, the idea that balanced trade or a
trade surplus should be an explicit goal of pol-
icymakers is utter folly. Between 1983 and
2007, the annual U.S. trade deficit increased
from $67.1 billion to around $819.4 billion—
or by nearly six-fold in real terms.55 During
that same period real GDP grew at an average
annual rate of 3.2 percent and employers added
an average of 1.8 million net new jobs to pay-
rolls every year.56 The unemployment rate also
declined over the period: the average rate in the
1980s was 7.2 percent; in the 1990s it was 5.7
percent; and, between 2000 and 2007 it aver-
aged 5.0 percent.57
The surge in unemployment during 2008
from 4.9 percent in January to 7.2 percent in
December cannot be attributed to a growing
trade deficit, since the deficit shrunk consider-
ably during the year.58 The January–November
trade deficit in goods and services stood at
$631 billion in 2008, $643 billion in 2007, and
$693 billion in 2006. The November 2008
deficit was $40.4 billion, 34 percent lower than
the $61.4 billion registered during the peak
2008 deficit month of February.59
The trade deficit is maligned because imports
are maligned, but the fact is that imports declined
precipitously in the second half of 2008 as the
U.S. economy entered recession and unemploy-
ment began to climb.60 According to a report
from the Progressive Policy Institute, a centrist
Democratic think tank, November’s import
decline of $25 billion, or 12 percent from the
previous month, and the $46 billion five-month
decline from July’s peak, were the steepest drops
in import values since 1942. The author corrob-
orates what Cato scholars have been reminding
policymakers for years: that there is a positive
correlation between imports and economic
growth:
The normal pattern of American eco-
nomics is for imports to grow, as shop-
pers pick up mall purchases and busi-
nesses buy metal, semiconductor chips,
and energy. Anxiety emerges when this
growth speeds dramatically, reflecting
an upheaval in commodity prices or a
rearrangement of global industry—but
almost invariably, except in the case of
sudden surges in energy prices, total job
numbers rise when imports are rising.
When imports go down, on the other
hand, it means nobody is buying things
and the economy is in recession. Since
World War II, therefore, periods of
recession and job loss match falls in
imports almost perfectly.61
Figures 3 and 4 support PPI’s assertion that
imports are pro-cyclical. Figure 3 plots annual
GDP growth on the x-axis and annual import
growth on the y-axis for the years 1960
through 2007. Each point represents the rate
of GDP growth and the rate of import growth
during a particular year. The trend line running
through the scatter plot shows a strong direct
correlation between the two series. In only two
of the 48 years plotted are GDP growth and
import growth not moving in the same direc-
tion, while the remaining 46 years fall into the
top right (positive, positive) or bottom left
(negative, negative) quadrants.
Figure 4 shows average annual import growth
by ranges of GDP growth. The picture clearly
demonstrates that import growth increases when
GDP growth increases, and import growth
increases faster when GDP growth is faster. The
same is true of the trade deficit and the current
account deficit, although politicians have tended
to muffle that fact to please important con-
stituents.
An excerpt from a 2008 opinion piece writ-
ten by Chairman Levin captures the essence of
the trade balance myth:
The U.S. trade deficit was $711.6 bil-
lion in 2007—among the highest in
history and a full 5 percent of the U.S.
economy. This deficit is a drag on eco-
nomic growth and on job creation at a
time when our nation can afford nei-
ther.62
Levin’s conclusion affirms the conventional
wisdom, but it is demonstrably incorrect. A
2007 Cato Institute study examined annual
changes in the U.S. current account balance
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and U.S. GDP growth since 1980. It found
that a rising deficit is typically associated with
faster economic growth, and a shrinking deficit
with slower growth. In those years in which the
deficit grew modestly, between 0.0 and 0.5 per-
cent, GDP growth averaged 3.0 percent. And
in those years in which the current account
deficit expanded by more than 0.5 percent of
GDP, real GDP growth grew by an average of
4.1 percent. In other words, economic growth
was more than twice as strong, on average, in
years in which the current account deficit grew
sharply compared to those years in which it
actually declined.63
The U.S. experience, as discussed above,
suggests that rising imports and an increasing
trade deficit are associated with increasing eco-
nomic activity, while declining imports and a
decreasing trade deficit are associated with
slowing economic activity. That relationship
may not hold in every country—as economic
structures and resource endowments differ by
country—but there is evidence from abroad
that should give pause to those who think that
balanced trade or a trade surplus should be a
national policy objective. 
Japan has run a trade surplus every year since
1980. Japan ran its largest trade surpluses in the
1990s, a decade often referred to as Japan’s “lost
decade.” Since 1991, Japan’s average annual eco-
nomic growth rate has been a moribund 1.2 per-
cent.64 Likewise, France suffered anemic eco-
nomic growth and double-digit unemployment
throughout the 1990s, while running fairly large
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current account surpluses.65 There simply isn’t
much real-world evidence supporting the
notion that a trade surplus leads to economic
growth or that a trade deficit stymies it. But pol-
icymakers should ask themselves this question:
What is the proper objective of economic poli-
cy—trade balance or economic growth?
An even more inane assertion commonly
heard from trade’s detractors is that U.S. trade
policy should concern itself with bilateral trade
balances and that our bilateral trade deficit
with China, for example, is evidence of a
flawed trade policy. The Economic Policy
Institute, a Washington-based clearinghouse
for ideas promoted by organized labor, likes to
alert the public to what it sees as the perils of
unbalanced bilateral trade. In the zero-sum
worldview of EPI’s Robert Scott: 
Unbalanced U.S. trade with China
since 2001 has had a devastating effect
on U.S. workers. Between 2001 and
2007, 2.3 million jobs were lost or dis-
placed, including 366,000 in 2007
alone. These jobs were displaced by the
growth of the U.S. trade deficit with
China, which increased from $84 bil-
lion in 2001 to $262 billion in 2007.66
It’s difficult to pick a place to begin expos-
ing the absurdity and recklessness of that state-
ment. But one might start by pointing out that
China—with its big bilateral surplus—has
actually shed many millions more manufactur-
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ing jobs than the United States has in recent
years—and for the same reasons U.S. jobs van-
ished: increased labor productivity.67 Or one
could question the premise that the $178 bil-
lion net increase in imports from China
between 2001 and 2007 was offset by an equal
reduction in American purchases of goods that
were produced mostly in American factories,
and not imported from other low-wage coun-
tries before 2001. Or one might reject Scott’s
apparent assumption that U.S. workers and
Chinese workers (with their different physical
and human capital endowments) are close sub-
stitutes, or the validity of the proposition that
exports create jobs, therefore imports destroy
jobs. The fact is that U.S. labor and Chinese
labor are better characterized as complements
in a transnational production supply chain
rather than competing substitutes in a zero-
sum world. That is a relatively new reality of
international commerce that trade policy, trade
negotiations, and too many trade commenta-
tors have yet to fully grasp.
Over the past couple of decades, China has
become a prime destination for investment in
low-to-medium-value manufacturing operations
and final assembly processing. Many companies
around the world that used to produce entirely in
one locale—typically in the companies’ home
countries—have adopted transnational produc-
tion processes, and China often features promi-
nently in their supply chains. Thus, a good por-
tion of what used to show up on U.S. trade sta-
tistics as imports from Japan or Korea or Taiwan
or Thailand, now register as imports from China
simply because of China’s usual position at the
end of the production supply chain. Because
China is the final country from which these
transnationally produced goods are shipped to
the United States, the value of the cargo is regis-
tered as an import from China.
This change in production processes is
made evident by a review of the trade data,
which reveals that imports from east Asia (as a
percent of total U.S. import value) have been
remarkably steady over the past 15 years.68 In
1995, imports from east Asia accounted for 30
percent of all U.S. imports of goods and ser-
vices. In 2001, the relative value from east Asia
fell to 26 percent before rising slightly to 28
percent in 2007.69 However, China’s share of
the east Asian total has grown considerably—
from 20 percent in 1995 to 34 percent in 2001,
and to 58 percent in 2007.70
So, although a significantly larger percentage
of imports comes to the United States directly
from China, the overall value of imports from
the region, as a percentage of all U.S. imports,
has been steady (and, in fact, declined slightly).
Japan’s, Taiwan’s, and South Korea’s share of
U.S. import value declined over the period,
while China’s grew considerably. There has sim-
ply been a shift in production processes—which
speaks to the internationalization of supply
chains more than anything else—with China
featuring prominently as the final assembly
point for goods destined for the United States.
These data also strongly support the argument
that Chinese exports to the United States have
not come at the expense of U.S. workers, but
rather at the expense of workers in other Asian
countries that used to perform these relatively
low-skilled functions before transnational pro-
duction became so common.
Further evidence that the bilateral trade
account scaremongers are wrong can be found in
some recently published research from more
objective sources. A recent study from the U.S.
International Trade Commission found that only
about 50 percent of the value of a typical contain-
er of imports from China is Chinese value-added.
The other half comprises material and labor from
other countries.71 A 2003 Stanford University
study found Chinese value-added to be even
smaller—at around 35 percent.72 A recent
Congressional Budget Office survey of these and
other studies puts Chinese value-added in the
range of 35 to 55 percent of the value of “Chinese
imports.”73
The fact of the proliferation of transnational
supply chains renders bilateral trade accounting
almost entirely meaningless. What significance
should be attached to the fact that the United
States runs a trade deficit with China with
respect to Apple iPods? For Christian Weller
and Holly Wheeler at the Center for American
Progress, the deficit in high-tech products is
“worrisome since it shows that many of our
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trading partners are eating our lunch in the high-
tech competi tion where they can develop indi-
vidual niches.”74 But that conclusion really miss-
es the big picture. The proper conclusion should
account for the words inscribed on the back of
every iPod: “Designed by Apple in California;
Assembled in China.” Imports of iPods from
China—like many (perhaps most) high-tech
products imported from China—support high-
paying American jobs in engineering, design,
marketing, manufacturing, and logistics, as well
as jobs in the transportation and retail sectors.
A 2007 study published by the University of
California–Irvine sought to determine “who
captures value in a global innovation system” by
disaggregating the components contained in an
Apple iPod and determining the companies
and countries involved in manufacturing a unit
in China. The authors found that the compo-
nents were produced in the United States,
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and China by
companies headquartered in the United States,
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The total cost of
producing the iPod (components plus labor)
was estimated to be about $144. Most of the
profits on the constituent components accrue
to Japanese companies, who produce the most
important and most expensive parts. Two U.S.
and some other foreign components’ producers
all capture small shares of the value. But the
lion’s share of value accrues to Apple since
iPods retail for $299 and the cost of production
is $144 (at the time this article was written).
Some of the $155 per-unit mark-up goes
toward compensating U.S. distributors, retail-
ers, and marketers, while the rest is distributed
to Apple shareholders or devoted to research
and development, which supports engineering
and design jobs higher up the value chain.75
Should we lament a trade deficit in iPods or
any other products assembled abroad that com-
prise U.S. value-added and support high-pay-
ing U.S. jobs, as some scholars of trade policy
do? Before jumping to conclusions, it would be
wise to consider this important point in the
iPod study:
[T]rade statistics can mislead as much
as inform. For every $300 iPod sold in
the U.S., the politically volatile U.S.
trade deficit with China increased by
about $150 (the factory cost). Yet, the
value added to the product through
assembly in China is probably a few
dollars at most.76
For all those reasons, worrying about the
bilateral trade deficit with China is a bit hys-
terical and misplaced.
Myth 3: Our Trade Partners Cheat with
Impunity
The third myth is that the United States is
losing at trade because its trade partners cheat
with impunity, and that better enforcement of
our current trade agreements would help reverse
myths one and two. Chairman Levin is fond of
this theory:
Take, for example, the WTO where we
should be insisting each and every day
that our trading partners play by the
same internationally negotiated rules as
we do. Under the Clinton administra-
tion, from 1992 through 2000, the
United States filed an average of 11
WTO cases per year to pry open for-
eign markets for U.S. exporters of goods
and services. From 2001 to now, the
United States has filed an average of just
three cases per year.77
There is no doubt that our trade partners
have violated trade rules over the years, both
knowingly and unknowingly. And so has the
United States. But the implication that viola-
tions are so endemic as to require daily, high-
profile enforcement efforts is misleading. It
could be that more WTO cases were brought
during the Clinton administration than during
the Bush administration because the former had
a hand at negotiating the Uruguay Round,
which created the WTO. That experience gave
Clinton administration negotiators active
knowledge about which countries were already
likely to be out of compliance with provisions of
the various new agreements. Many of the cases
filed during the Clinton years addressed residual
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issues from the negotiations or had been on the
USTR’s radar for a long time, and thus were
essentially low-hanging fruit with which to test
the dispute settlement system. Also, it is reason-
able to assume that, in response to the growing
body of WTO jurisprudence over the years,
WTO members have, at least to some extent,
amended their rules, regulations, and practices.
Accordingly, a comparison of the two adminis-
trations’ records in this area is misleading.
All trade agreement member countries
should have recourse to resolving problems and
curbing chronic violations. That’s part of what
the rules-based system of trade is about, as
Chairman Levin implies. But it is also impor-
tant to recognize that trade enforcement is not
an end in itself. Countries enter trade agree-
ments to increase trade flows, not to claim the
title of having initiated the most trade litigation
or having won the most disputes. The United
States has recourse to formal dispute settlement
in the WTO and in its other trade agreements,
but those are not the only channels for resolving
disputes. Trade enforcement does not always
need to be antagonistic, nor must it be so high-
profile—as though its purpose were to avail
politicians of the opportunity for theatrics.
Communication between the United States
and its trade partners about issues that could
evolve into formal trade disputes is an ongoing
process. Potential issues are frequently identi-
fied, defused, and resolved through bilateral
exchanges away from the cameras in capital
cities and through WTO delegations in
Geneva. Every year, the United States publishes
its Special 301 and National Trade Estimates
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, which alert
other countries to America’s trade policy con-
cerns and often trigger resolution of disputes—
well before the issues become prominent politi-
cal footballs. And the Strategic Economic Dia-
logue between the United States and China
during the latter part of the Bush administration
led to quiet reforms in China and helped resolve
concerns about various Chinese trade practices
without the need of WTO adjudication.
However, Chairman Levin and others in
Congress hold the view that China is the most
prominent cheater on matters of trade, engag-
ing in subsidization of industry, currency
manipulation, intellectual property theft, unfair
labor practices, dumping, and other under-
handed methods. Although some of those alle-
gations have merit—and resolution of some
claims is being pursued through different
channels—the total impact on trade is quite
small. For example, trade enforcement hawks
have for years alleged that illegal Chinese sub-
sidization was a root cause of the U.S. bilateral
trade deficit with China, and that better
enforcement would help balance trade. 
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce
reversed its long-standing policy of not applying
the Countervailing Duty (or anti-subsidy) Law
to so-called nonmarket economies when it initi-
ated a CVD investigation of Coated Free Sheet
Paper from China. Subsequent to that policy
change, 12 more CVD cases were filed. The
results in some of those 2007 and 2008 CVD
investigations are not yet final. But even if coun-
tervailable subsidies are ultimately found in each
case, the total value of “unfairly” subsidized im-
ports would be, at most, less than 1 percent ($1.6
billion) of the total U.S.-China trade deficit in
2006 ($232.6 billion).78 When one adds 2006
import values of Chinese products subject to
anti-dumping investigations that were initiated
after 2006, the total value of potentially unfair
imports rises to only slightly more than 1 percent
($2.38 billion) of the total 2006 deficit.
If Chinese unfair trade practices are so
insidious, where are all of the cases? Why has
U.S. industry been unwilling to avail itself of
the opportunity to demonstrate the unfairness
of Chinese competition, particularly when—as
many of our policymakers assert—U.S. manu-
facturing is on life support? And why do
“unfairly traded” imports represent such a tiny
fraction of the total bilateral trade deficit? All
of the inflammatory accusations of cheating
hurled at China cannot be justified by the
dearth of evidence thus far presented. If unfair
trade practices amount to only 1 percent of our
trade deficit with China, then surely the acri-
mony that characterizes the U.S. debate about
the trade relationship should yield to comity.
Last year a study was commissioned by
Chairman Rangel to investigate, among other
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things, the relationship between Chinese gov-
ernment policies and the U.S. trade deficit with
China. But that study was abruptly terminated
when Rangel decided, after seeing a draft of the
International Trade Commission’s report, that
proper treatment of the topic was impossible
because of “limitations on the Commission’s
time, resources, and lack of experience to date in
investigating, identifying, obtaining, and analyz-
ing the kinds of information critical to the
analysis sought in the Committee’s request.”79
The chairman cited numerous “mischaracteriza-
tions” in the draft. But the termination of this
much-ballyhooed and long-awaited study on a
highly controversial issue has raised suspicions
that Rangel cancelled the report because it
found no significant linkage between Chinese
government policies and the bilateral trade
deficit. Unless the ITC is allowed to publish its
research, the public will never know for sure.
Chairman Levin also cites the Bush admin-
istration’s failure to implement the ITC’s recom-
mendations for trade restrictions in four so-
called China-specific safeguard cases as evi-
dence of lax enforcement.80 But President Bush
was simply exercising his discretion to overrule
the ITC on the grounds that relief was not in
the national economic interest—a perspective
that members of Congress, representing state
and local interests, are unlikely to consider.81 But
if you ask U.S. importers, retailers, and manufac-
turers who rely on Chinese inputs for their own
production and sales, few would complain of lax
enforcement under the Bush administration. 
Less than one year after expiration of the
long-standing textile and apparel quota regime
on January 1, 2005—which had restricted
imports of textiles and clothing from most
developing countries since 1974—the Bush
administration forced the Chinese to accept
three more years of quotas under threat that it
would otherwise unilaterally impose restrictions
on hundreds of products by way of the the so-
called China-specific textile safeguard. The
China textile safeguard was another concession
granted by China to the United States upon its
accession to the WTO. Those quotas were just
lifted on January 1, 2009. Also, during the years
of the Clinton administration, 15 anti-dumping
measures were imposed on imports from China,
but during the Bush presidency, 42 anti-dump-
ing measures were imposed, restricting imports
on a variety of products.
Of course, the number of measures imposed
depends on a variety of factors and does not
support a conclusion that the Bush administra-
tion has been tougher on China. But nor does
Chairman Levin’s implication that the greater
number of WTO cases brought by the Clinton
administration supports the conclusion that
the Bush administration was asleep at the
wheel on enforcement issues.
Certainly, there have been violations and alle-
gations of violations that fall outside the reach of
U.S. trade remedies laws. In 2006, the USTR
published its “Top-to-Bottom Review” of U.S.-
China trade relations, in which it proclaimed the
beginning of a new phase in the relationship,
stating, effectively, that the honeymoon period
(of reform implementation) was over and fore-
shadowing greater resort to the WTO dispute
settlement system to achieve further compliance.
One month after publication of that report, the
USTR filed a WTO complaint alleging that cer-
tain Chinese policies discriminate against
imported automobile parts. In 2008, a dispute
settlement panel ruled in favor of the United
States. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the
major findings of that panel in December 2008.
Before the auto parts case, only one com-
plaint about Chinese practices had been lodged
with the Dispute Settlement Body. It con-
cerned a value-added tax on integrated circuits
that was allegedly applied in full to imports
only. During the consultation phase of the dis-
pute (and without need of formal adjudica-
tion), the Chinese agreed to change their prac-
tice and the dispute was resolved. 
In 2007, the USTR filed three WTO cases
against China. The first involved certain tax
provisions that allegedly amounted to subsidiza-
tion of Chinese exporters. In response to the
allegations, China changed its tax rebate prac-
tices (although the dispute is not completely
resolved yet). The second concerned enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights. After failing
to resolve this dispute during the consultations
phase, the United States requested the establish-
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ment of a dispute settlement panel, which ruled
in favor of the U.S. position on two of the three
issues raised (finding that both China’s copy-
right law and customs law were inconsistent
with another WTO agreement). The third
WTO case concerned alleged barriers facing
foreign traders and distributors of copyrighted
materials like books, videos, and DVDs. As of
publication of this study, the dispute settlement
panel has not produced its report.
In early 2008, the USTR brought a sixth case,
alleging discrimination against U.S. providers of
financial services information in China. That
dispute also was resolved during the consulta-
tions phase, when China agreed to remedy the
measures at issue. In December 2008, the United
States brought a seventh case against China in
the WTO when it requested consultations over
various government grants and loans alleged to
be available to Chinese enterprises.
Enforcement is an important part of the
rules-based system of trade. But enforcement
efforts are more nuanced than some policy-
makers care to admit. Certainly, the emphasis
placed by some on lax enforcement is not com-
mensurate with the relatively small impact of
trade “violations” on the trade account or the
economy. All of the harping has conferred
undue significance on the issue and has rein-
forced damaging perceptions about trade and
our trade partners.
Changing the Terms
of the Debate
Although there is nearly a consensus among
economists that the benefits of free trade dwarf
its costs, the public appears to be less receptive
to pointy-headed economic analysis than it is
to visuals and anecdotes. And that reality favors
purveyors of protectionist gloom-and-doom.
While the benefits of free trade for American
families and businesses are large, they are dif-
fuse and often taken for granted. On the other
hand, the much smaller “costs” resulting from
such trade tend to be concentrated within
industries or geographies, or among people
with similar skill sets.82
What, then, leaves a more a lasting impres-
sion: a story about how a new trade agreement
will add $1,200 per year to the average family’s
purchasing power, or a story about a shuttered
steel mill and the residual effects of that closure
on the community and its once-proud people?
Ironically, protectionists appear to have a com-
parative advantage in cultivating messages about
trade that stick. Given the incessant competition
for the American public’s attention, and the
apparent necessity of those competing for that
limited attention span to break everything down
into short bullet points and compelling visuals,
protectionists may be better suited to make their
case than are free traders.
Without some explanatory discussion first,
once the public’s mind has been filled with sto-
ries of doom and gloom, it’s tough to put into
context—and refute in a 10-second sound
bite—the exaggeration that three million good-
paying manufacturing jobs have been lost since
2000; or that the $800 billion current account
deficit reflects a failure of U.S. trade policy; or
that we don’t make anything in the United
States anymore; or that China is eating our
lunch; or that the U.S. market is wide open,
while our trade partners keep U.S. imports out.
Free-trade advocacy has assumed a defensive
posture, but it must find a way back to the other
side of the 50-yard line. It must force protec-
tionists to refute the abundance of evidence—
anecdotal and empirical—that argues against
their policy prescriptions, rather than let the
anti-trade crowd moralize its perspectives with
diversions, half-truths, and outright lies.
In November 2007, a centrist Democratic
think tank called Third Way published the first
installment of a study titled, “Why Lou Dobbs
Is Winning.” It’s an important contribution to
the discussion about why the pro-trade con-
sensus collapsed and what to do about it.
About free-trade advocates (and advocacy), it
offers three broad conclusions that are good
launching points for further discussion.
First, the authors conclude that free traders
are “guilty of a failure of vision”: 
The cause of open trade has been most
compelling when linked to a broader
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political and economic vision. In the
post–World War years, that goal was
preserving the peace; during the Cold
War, the goal was fighting commu-
nism. Today, the overall goal of Ameri-
can global engagement is far less clear,
and trade’s role in achieving that goal is
murky. How do open-traders envision
the world and America’s place in it 20
years down the road? At the moment,
we have no compelling answer.83
The most principled case for free trade is a
moral case. It is rooted in some of the very ideals
upon which the United States was founded: the
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, and the
rule of law. Every American should be free to
transact with whomever he wishes to transact,
regardless of the nationality or location of the
other party. Voluntary exchange is inherently
fair, benefits both parties, and allocates scarce
resources more efficiently than a system under
which government dictates or limits choices.
Individuals deciding for themselves how and
with whom to conduct commerce will advance
their own well-being, and thus the nation’s, far
more efficiently than would some centralized
authority that tries to influence private decisions
by tipping the scales.
Furthermore, government intervention in
voluntary economic exchange on behalf of
some citizens at the expense of others is inher-
ently unfair, inefficient, and subverts the rule of
law. Instead of individuals seeking to optimize
their conditions subject to the rules, they are
incentivized to divert resources from produc-
tive endeavors to changing the rules to their
advantage through politics and backroom deal-
making.
Alas, this very sound and simple justifica-
tion for free trade has been distorted over the
years by groups seeking to tip the scales in their
favor. They mischaracterize trade in the ancient
but false dichotomy of the haves versus the
have-nots. Evil corporations, they say, benefit
from trade while regular people suffer its
wrath. The public is told that companies like
Wal-Mart profit from trade, but that the vast
benefits afforded Americans who shop at Wal-
Mart—benefits like more-affordable clothing,
food, and other everyday products—count for
nothing. The public is told that trade enriches
the Chinese government, but that the benefits
to U.S. manufacturers and their workers from
record export sales to Chinese customers over
the past few years are meaningless. In the polit-
ical realm, trade is never about individuals act-
ing in their own best interest by transacting
with whom they choose to transact. Instead,
trade is a zero-sum game featuring the collec-
tive “Us” versus the collective “Them,” and
“they” are gunning for “our” jobs and wealth
using underhanded tactics.
Of course the prescribed “elixir” of limiting
or regulating trade invariably benefits those
who speak the loudest against free trade. Trade
barriers are no different from earmarks. Trade
barriers are like pork projects. Trade barriers are
akin to the auto bailout. In all three cases, spe-
cial interests persuade rulemakers that their cir-
cumstances justify expropriation of other peo-
ple’s resources to subsidize their own endeavors.
Each is an affront to the rudimentary concept
of fairness, individual liberty, and the rule of
law.
Beyond the moral case for free trade, there is
the burgeoning reality that trade policy is badly
lagging commercial reality. Many Americans—
including policymakers—still embrace this ana-
chronistic view of trade as a zero-sum contest
between “our” producers and “their” producers.
The belief that we are “winning at trade” when
our producers sell more stuff than their produc-
ers requires ignorance of the evolution of global
business and trade patterns and sets us up for
some pretty awful public policy. 
Moreover, the U.S. economy comprises not
only insular domestic producers, but consumers,
wholesalers, retailers, importers, shippers, de-
signers, engineers, marketers, financiers, and
integrated producers who have great stakes in an
open world economy. What is in one producer’s
interest is not necessarily in the interest of the
other constituents in the economy or even other
producers in the same industry. That has always
been the case.
But today, international competition can
hardly be described as a contest between “our”
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producers and “their” producers. Whereas a gen-
eration ago a product bearing the logo of an
American company comprised exclusively U.S.
labor, materials, and overhead, today that is
much less likely. Products bearing the names of
U.S. companies often comprise substantial for-
eign value-added, regardless of whether the
product was “completed” in the United States or
abroad. Moreover, the distinction between U.S.
nameplate production and foreign nameplate
production has been blurred by foreign direct
investment, cross-ownership, equity tie-ins, and
transnational supply chains. As but one of myr-
iad examples, consider the “U.S.” auto industry,
as described by the Wall Street Journal:
Once you put down the flags and shut
off all the television ads with their
Heartland, apple-pie America imagery,
the truth of the car business is that it
transcends national boundaries. A car or
truck sold by a “Detroit” auto maker
such as GM, Ford or Chrysler could be
less American—as defined by the gov-
ernment’s standards for “domestic con-
tent”—than a car sold by Toyota, Honda
or Nissan—all of which have substantial
assembly and components operations in
the U.S.84
As noted earlier, the outdated “us-versus-
them” view of trade is reinforced by trade nego-
tiations, where representatives of governments
offer the “concession” of access to their markets
in exchange for the “benefit” of access to oth-
ers’ markets. But on whose behalf are those
negotiations conducted? Better access to the
Brazilian market for U.S.-based exporters ben-
efits U.S.-headquartered companies as well as
Stuttgart- or Tokyo-headquartered companies.
Likewise, better access to the U.S. market ben-
efits foreign-based producers as well as U.S.
and foreign producers operating in the United
States, who rely on access to imported raw
materials, components, and capital equipment.
The reality is that globalization has been
making this old adversarial framework obso-
lete. Companies are not competing for markets
through their governments’ trade negotiations
as much as their governments are competing to
secure valuable positions for their people in the
global supply chain. All countries are compet-
ing for investment in production processes and
all countries aspire to attract investment in the
highest value-added processes. Only the coun-
tries that have the highest-skilled human capi-
tal will occupy the most lucrative links of the
global supply chain. All countries, to compete
successfully for investment now and into the
future, need to have business and regulatory
environments that can accommodate the fast-
moving nature of global, just-in-time, transna-
tional production processes. That means coun-
tries must eliminate administrative and physi-
cal frictions that might slow the process and
deter investment. Good transportation and
communications infrastructure, access to ports
and to the country’s interior, rule of law,
administrative transparency, low or no trade
barriers, a relatively stable policy environment,
and a work force whose skills are suited for par-
ticular value-added activities in the supply
chain are increasingly the keys to attracting
investment.
International competition is no longer us
versus them. Instead it is more appropriately
characterized as a competition between differ-
ent supply chains, many of which comprise
value added from many different countries.
This description of how the international trad-
ing system really works must become second
nature to policymakers and the public if we are
to vanquish, once and for all, the outdated,
destructive characterization upon which rests
the argument for protection and insularity.
Second, Third Way concludes that “our bat-
tleground is data, not values”: 
Defenders of trade are losing public
support in part because of their strategy
and tactics. While critics of trade speak
evocatively of “fairness” and justice,”
trade-liberalizers counter with eco-
nomic numbers and opaque economic
theories. It is not only elitist; it is like
bringing a knife to a gun fight. It is not
enough to win the minds of the public;
we must win hearts as well.85
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It is a bit harsh to characterize the mar-
shalling of facts in support of an argument as
“elitist.” However, the point is well taken. In
the legal profession, there is an old adage that
says that if the facts aren’t on your side, then
pound the table. In essence, opponents of trade
follow that adage. They pound away with
imagery and evocative stories to compensate
for the dearth of facts supporting their posi-
tions. On numerous occasions, supporters of
trade have advocated the free-trade position in
debates, summoning the facts, demonstrating
how those facts support the conclusion that
free trade leads to greater opportunity and
prosperity than the alternatives, only to lose the
crowd’s sympathies to a protectionist argument
that ignores the facts and relies exclusively on a
story about the “unfair” impact of a plant clo-
sure. Of course, there is never the concession
that the existence of the tariff or quota in the
first place was the real unfair burden; that it
taxed the resources of other Americans (most-
ly, lower-income Americans) to subsidize the
incomes of the plant’s owners and workers.
Rather than focus on appealing new visuals
or anecdotes, trade advocates should take back
what has been commandeered by protection-
ists—namely, the claim to fairness and justice.
There is nothing “fair” about government poli-
cies that force some Americans to subsidize the
decisions and livelihoods of other Americans.
But to whom is it unfair when Americans are
free to exchange with anybody else in the
world? It’s certainly not unfair to U.S. produc-
ers or their workers, who know they must earn
each consumer’s business. It may constitute a
competitive reality that keeps profits lower
than the U.S. producers might like, but there’s
nothing unfair about that.
Recent studies demonstrate that U.S. trade
barriers are most pervasive and highest on basic
necessities, like food, clothing, and footwear. If
one also considers longstanding anti-dumping
and countervailing duty restrictions on steel,
lumber, and cement, the necessity of shelter is
also highly taxed through U.S. trade policy.
These tariffs benefit a few politically connect-
ed industries at U.S. consumers’ expense. And
by virtue of the fact that lower-income
Americans spend higher proportions of their
budgets on necessities, U.S. tariffs are the most
regressive taxes under law.86
Consider the case of U.S. shoe tariffs. The
weighted average U.S. tariff rate for all goods is
1.6 percent. But on footwear, tariffs start at 8.5
percent for leather dress shoes, increase to 20
percent for running shoes, and exceed 60 percent
for some low-cost sneakers. To put that in per-
spective, the tariff on cheap sneakers is roughly
three times the federal tax on a similarly-priced
pack of cigarettes, four times the national gas tax,
and twice the tax on whiskey, vodka, and other
spirits.87 Meanwhile, most footwear consumed
in the United States is produced by poor workers
in lower-income countries. Thus, U.S. protec-
tionism is a double whammy, disproportionately
harming poor families at home and abroad. It is
unfair and unjust, and its elimination should be
something that both engenders broad bipartisan
support and puts protectionists where they right-
fully should be—on the defensive.
Third, “our policies do nothing to restore
middle-class confidence in the future”: 
Middle-class economic anxiety is wide-
spread and legitimate. And fairly or not,
much of the blame for this anxiety is
landing squarely on trade. As a conse-
quence, advocates of trade must free
themselves from the narrow silo of
trade-specific policy and embed their
goals in a broader agenda that addresses
all of the sources of middle-class eco-
nomic anxiety—as well as middle-class
hopes for success. Reforming and ex-
panding Trade Adjustment Assistance is
necessary but far from sufficient.
Americans have to feel secure and confi-
dent in their own economic future
before they are comfortable reaching out
to the world.88
The Third Way identifies a legitimate prob-
lem—that much of the blame for middle-class
anxiety has landed squarely on trade. But, in this
case, its solution is wrong. Free trade is very sim-
ply about the natural right of people to choose
how and with whom they transact. Assertion of
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those rights need not—and indeed should
not—take a defensive posture. We need not
compensate others or apologize for making the
choices that optimize our own well-being. As
economist Steven Landsburg put it:
Suppose, after years of buying sham-
poo at your local pharmacy, you dis-
cover you can order the same shampoo
for less money on the Web. Do you
have an obligation to compensate your
pharmacist? If you move to a cheaper
apartment, should you compensate
your landlord? When you eat at Mc-
Donald’s, should you compensate the
owners of the diner next door? Public
policy should not be designed to ad-
vance moral instincts that we all reject
every day of our lives.89
Americans no more owe the textile worker
who lost his job because J. C. Penney decided
it would be better for its shareholders to source
its clothing primarily from Vietnam than we
owe a bodega clerk who lost his job because we
prefer to shop at the new supermarket. In fact,
there is a stronger case to be made that the tex-
tile worker should compensate the consumers
of the products he made, if tariffs and quotas
forced consumers to subsidize his job. 
Trade is not the reason for so-called “mid-
dle class” angst. But scaremongering about
trade is certainly one of them. Purveyors of the
trade myths described earlier tend also to per-
petuate the related myth that import growth
has created greater income disparity, which has
led to the erosion of the middle class. But that’s
just not true. As imports have risen, so have
real wages and benefits in the United States. 
Over the last decade, average real compen-
sation—wages plus benefits—increased by 22
percent. Real median household income was 6
percent higher at the peak of the current busi-
ness cycle (2007) than it was at a comparable
point in the previous business cycle. And, while
doomsayers point to the decrease in the num-
ber of households earning between $35,000
and $75,000 as evidence of middle-class ero-
sion, they tend to ignore the fact that the num-
ber of households earning more than $75,000
has increased, while the number earning less
than $35,000 has declined.90
If Americans break away from the oppressive
political rhetoric about trade and the economy
and make their own observations, they are likely
to conclude that the country has strengths and
competitive advantages unmatched anywhere
else in the world. The continuing flow of foreign
investment into the U.S. economy is testament to
that fact. 
Beyond these strengths and competitive ad-
vantages enjoyed by U.S. residents, there is the
fact that 95 percent of the world’s consumers live
outside of the United States. Yet when politicians
and the media speak about trade, they usually
focus exclusively on the Malthusian fiction of six
billion people competing for 100 million U.S.
jobs. From the perspective of the American work-
er, under this slanted premise, trade and global-
ization can only upset the apple cart. There are
only ramifications—and negative ones at that—
on the supply side of the equation. All that trade
has to offer under this portrayal is increasing
competition for my job, and downward pressure
on my wages. 
But an accurate accounting of the effects of
trade and globalization on the lives of Americans
across the income and wealth spectrum must
include a consideration of the fact that the pre-
ponderance of world-demand growth henceforth
will occur outside of the United States. And the
preponderance of the value of global production
will happen pursuant to a global division of labor,
which renders American jobs complementary to
—and not in competition with—labor in the
world’s most populous countries. One must thus
discount predictions of U.S. wage suppression
and consider the positive impact on U.S. wages of
foreign demand growth. The media and Con-
gress have their motives for wanting Americans
to see the glass as half empty. But we need not fol-
low the script.
Rebuilding the Consensus with
Truth and Transparency
More than a decade of Democratic opposi-
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tion to trade liberalization has almost erased
from memory the fact that the fathers of the
modern American free-trade movement were
not Republicans, but Democrats like Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, Presidents Harry Truman
and John F. Kennedy, and Sen. Albert Gore Sr.,
who each understood the economic and diplo-
matic importance of open trade.91
When freedom to trade is properly cast as a
fundamental right and impediments to exercis-
ing that right are cast as coercive and immoral,
trade liberalization can once again be a biparti-
san endeavor. When protectionism can be
properly equated to earmarking and backroom
dealmaking, and cast as a regressive tax, with
onerous effects on poorer people in the United
States and abroad, the cause of free trade can
transcend partisanship. When trade liberaliza-
tion can be seen as strengthening the ties that
bind people in different nations and reducing
prospects for conflict, free trade can become a
goal shared by all Americans.
Unfortunately, the heated partisan debate
about trade over the past several years—and
the tactics used to spread skepticism across the
country—probably precludes resumption of an
ambitious agenda of U.S.-led trade liberaliza-
tion during the next couple years. But it cer-
tainly should not preclude the steps necessary
to start rebuilding the pro-trade consensus. 
Repair Perceptions First 
President Obama would do the country a
great service by encouraging an open dialogue
about trade and globalization, by challenging
critics and proponents of trade to support their
assertions, and by supporting the publication of
objective studies about manufacturing, imports,
trade agreements, and the trade account. Find-
ing and sharing the truth about trade should be
among the first steps toward rebuilding the pro-
trade consensus.
To repair unfavorable perceptions about
trade, President Obama should speak openly
and honestly about the myths that have been
the catalysts for the backlash against trade. He
should emphasize that U.S. manufacturing is
not in decline, but rather that U.S. factories
remain the world’s most prolific, generating
more value than the manufacturing sector of
any other country in the world. 
President Obama should try to reverse the
effects of years of needless misconception about
imports and the trade deficit. Americans enjoy
sports metaphors, but the trade account and the
current account cannot be likened to score-
boards. The fact of our large trade deficit is not
evidence that we are losing at trade. It is evi-
dence that foreigners have confidence in the
U.S. economy and that their investments here
have supplemented Americans’ income streams
by keeping interest rates lower than they would
have otherwise been. It is also evidence that
there is a lot of pent-up demand among the 95
percent of the world’s population living in other
countries, and that the United States must stay
engaged in the global economy to benefit from
the likely explosion of global demand in the near
future.
In many cases, imports directly support U.S.
jobs. U.S. producers routinely account for the
majority of the value of U.S. imports. Those
imports are used as complements to U.S. work-
ers to produce the wares coming out of U.S.
factories. Without imports, the cost of produc-
tion would be higher, and the expedient to
reduce labor costs would be more likely to
materialize quickly.
The iPod example described earlier speaks
to the complementary nature of global produc-
tion. Rising imports are often a necessary con-
dition of U.S. job growth. Without access to
assembly operations in lower-cost countries,
the mass production and proliferation of iPods
and similar devices likely would not have been
possible. Instead of $299, iPods would cost
perhaps $500 or more if they had to be pro-
duced entirely in the United States. At that
price point, it is unlikely that sales of iPods
would ever have been as successful as they have
been, and the need for all of those American
jobs in engineering, logistics, transportation,
advertising, web design, and retailing might
never have materialized.
The president should also clarify that the
allegations about the Bush administration’s
failure to enforce trade agreements have been
driven by the politics of special interests. Sure,
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it is likely that some violations have occurred
and persisted that should have been addressed
and resolved. But the fact is that so-called
unfair trade constitutes a small fraction of the
total trade and the emphasis placed on our fail-
ings to better enforce trade laws is simply not
justified by the economic stakes. That empha-
sis only raises American suspicions and hostil-
ity toward trade when the overwhelming
majority of trade is unobjectionable.
That is not to say that the president should
forswear trade litigation and systematically
ignore violations. The president should explain
in clear terms to the public that the United
States is part of a rules-based system of trade
that is not perfect, but that has worked with
great success over the years. Since the advent of
the WTO there have been virtually no trade
wars, but rather, the evolution of a fairly robust
system for resolving disputes. Its continued suc-
cess will ensure that U.S. industries have
recourse to resolution of important violations.
However, its continued success also requires that
the United States lives up to its own commit-
ments and respects the findings of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body.
He should explain that the WTO is not
anti-American (as detractors suggest), but that
the dispute settlement system has a pro-com-
plainant bias that reflects the fact that member
countries tend not to seek WTO adjudication
of issues willy-nilly. Rather, members tend to
bring cases about which they are reasonably
confident of success. And that confidence
comes from careful deliberation about the pros
and cons of filing particular complaints. 
The president should also remind Americans
that they have some profound competitive
advantages in our solid institutions and way of
life. He should explain that for all those reasons,
trade must be embraced. And on top of that, by
the way, 95 percent of the world’s consumers live
outside of the United States. As they grow rich-
er, the pie will grow larger even faster. To partake
of that growing pie, America needs to stay front
and center in the global economy.
Some Specific Initiatives
Concurrent with President Obama’s efforts
to reassure Americans that trade is not a
scourge and is vital to economic growth, the
Obama administration should undertake spe-
cific initiatives to reinforce those assurances,
rebuild U.S. credibility on trade, and demon-
strate how trade liberalization benefits lower-
income families in the United States and
around the world.
1. Establish a “Trade Transparency Initiative.”
To those ends, President Obama should an-
nounce something like a “Trade Transparency
Initiative,” with the goal of publishing indepen-
dent findings about the effects of trade and trade
barriers on the U.S. economy and its constituent
elements without political interference. As of
now, the ITC serves that role, but in a manner
that denies full independence and objectivity.
One of the ITC’s functions is to provide eco-
nomic research in accordance with the research
parameters established by a requesting congres-
sional committee member or a designated exec-
utive-branch official. That Congress or an
administration official can limit or expand the
scope of a ITC research project—and can com-
mission and decommission those studies on a
whim—subjects the process to bias, politics, and
grandstanding. The ITC, or some other agency
that is sufficiently shielded from political influ-
ence, should be allowed to fulfill its statutory
authority to conduct independent research and
publish findings on matters related to trade, and
the public should be directed to those findings as
objective sources of analysis. An independent
process like that—which is properly publicized
by a president promoting change—would prob-
ably help disentangle trade from the truth-sup-
pressing effects of politics and help fulfill the
president’s goal of having a more transparent and
open government.92
Perhaps the Obama administration’s first
study under the Trade Transparency Initiative
should focus on the U.S. Tariff Schedule. The
report would likely reveal that U.S. tariffs are
highest on shoes, clothing, clothing inputs (like
fabric, yarn, and cotton), food (including fruits
and vegetables), and food ingredients (like sugar,
wheat, and soybean). In conjunction with trade
remedy duties on imported steel, lumber, and
cement, U.S. tariffs and quotas on food and
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clothing ensure that the prices of life’s most basic
necessities (food, clothing, and shelter) are arti-
ficially inflated by government policies. And
since lower-income Americans spend a higher
proportion of their budgets on life’s necessities,
these trade policies amount to the kind of
regressive tax that Democrats profess to abhor.
In a similar vein, a Trade Transparency
Initiative report profiling recipients of U.S. agri-
cultural subsidies would likely help put to rest
the notion that poor family farms are the bene-
ficiaries of taxpayer subsidies. In reality, thou-
sands of households across the United States
(including some addresses in Manhattan)
receive checks from the federal government to
not produce agricultural products. Real estate in
certain jurisdictions is bought and sold with
agricultural subsidies listed as a conveyance with
the sale of the property.93 And, as is the case
with respect to imported footwear, many U.S.
tariffs are vestiges of a bygone era and no longer
have patron industries or producers to provide
even the faintest veil of justification for their
existence.
President Obama can help relieve the burden
that is borne, in particular, by lower-income
Americans from the tariffs on food and cloth-
ing, and reduce subsidy transfers to America’s
already wealthy agricultural sectors by challeng-
ing Congress to finally abolish regressive tariffs
and farm programs. The economic benefits of
those reforms would be a permanent stimulus
for the U.S. economy, and would cost American
taxpayers nothing. The unbiased empirical
results of the Trade Transparency Initiative
would give President Obama the ammunition
he will need to put congressional protectionists
of both parties where they rightfully belong—on
the permanent defensive.
2. Reinforce for Congress the Fact that a
Unilateralist Trade Policy Undermines a Multilat-
eralist Foreign Policy. Over the last few years,
Democrats have expressed a desire to repair
America’s damaged credibility abroad. President
Obama shares that goal, which would be sup-
ported by eliminating trade barriers on clothing
and food and rescinding agricultural subsidies.
After all, it is factory workers and farmers in
developing countries who produce the kinds of
products most heavily penalized by U.S. protec-
tionism.
But to really make progress toward repairing
America’s damaged credibility abroad, President
Obama will have to challenge the congressional
leadership to abandon its increasingly provoca-
tive and unilateralist positions on trade. The
president was successful at convincing Congress
that “Buy American” provisions do not help
advance U.S. standing in the world. But there is
much more to be done. 
For example, the 2008 Democratic Platform
includes this criticism of the Bush administra-
tion’s foreign policy:
In Asia, we belittled South Korean
efforts to improve relations with the
North. In Latin America, from Mexico
to Argentina, we failed to address con-
cerns about immigration and equity
and economic growth.94
However, these are the same countries that are
most affronted by Democratic Party antago-
nisms on trade: Mexico on NAFTA, and
Colombia, Peru, and Korea on pending free-
trade agreements. Chairman Rangel and Chair-
man Levin traveled to Peru in 2007 for the pur-
pose of overseeing the Peruvian government’s
rewriting of its labor laws, as a condition of pass-
ing the Peru FTA. The agreement was imple-
mented in January, but the chairmen have hint-
ed that the Peruvians have more hoops to jump
through yet. Both chairmen continue to ignore
the tremendous progress that the Colombian
government has made in reducing violence and
prosecuting thugs who have terrorized labor
organizers in the past. Both chairmen continue
to demand more progress as a condition of pass-
ing the Colombia FTA. And both are so open-
ly distrustful of the South Korean government
that they are demanding what amounts to man-
aged trade and conditional market access terms
as an insurance policy.
It is difficult to appreciate any rhetorical
differences between the Democratic leader-
ship’s approach to our trade partners and the
Bush administration’s approach to foreign rela-
tions that Congress so condemned. President
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Obama should help Congress come to terms
with this glaring inconsistency and recognize
the significance of leaving three partners at the
altar, after multi-year courtships, by failing to
even consider their signed free-trade agree-
ments.
President Obama must push Congress to at
least make good on the U.S. government’s
promises to subject those agreements to votes in
the legislature. He need not push for new trade
agreements at this point and he need not con-
tinue ongoing negotiations. Better to rebuild
consensus first. But he must push hard for con-
gressional consideration of the pending agree-
ments because U.S. failure to live up to this most
basic of obligations casts a pall over U.S. trade
policy and tarnishes America’s image as a credi-
ble and reliable partner. Moreover, congression-
al refusal to consider the agreements represents
an immense diplomatic failure that strains criti-
cal U.S. alliances and emboldens America’s
detractors in two key regions: Asia and Latin
America.
As important as our military and diplomatic
alliances are, a majority of America’s allies care as
much or more about the economic relationship.
That is why many of our closest allies—from
Canada to Australia to Colombia to Korea—
have sought to cement bilateral economic ties
with the United States. And some of these eco-
nomic relationships serve to increase American
influence in regions that are prone to episodic
anti-Americanism.
Continued American economic engage-
ment with the rest of the world is essential to
national security, and building economic ties
with less-friendly nations raises the cost of
confrontation and discourages rogue behavior.
Moreover, if President Obama is to succeed in
“renewing American leadership in the world,”
he must renew U.S. leadership on trade—a
cornerstone of the global framework since
World War II. 
3. Craft a Pragmatic, Principled Approach to
Enforcement. In keeping with the idea that trade
enforcement—as abused as that term has
become—can be a constructive tool for opening
markets where liberalization has been too slow
in coming, President Obama should continue
the practice of producing annual foreign trade
barrier reports to alert trade partners to U.S.
concerns and to put them on notice that formal
dispute settlement proceedings could be lodged
if progress toward resolution is not forthcoming.
And, indeed, when U.S. exporters are experienc-
ing chronic problems with market access in for-
eign countries, or their expectations of national
treatment continue to go unmet, and it is deter-
mined to be in the national interest to pursue
dispute settlement, then the Obama administra-
tion should not be shy about lodging formal
WTO complaints.
However, efforts to systematize and com-
moditize trade complaints—which seems to be
an objective of the Trade Enforcement Act of
2009, with its creation of an Office of the Con-
gressional Enforcer—are likely to be perceived as
provocative and could undermine global support
for the rules-based system of trade.
Relatedly, if the administration and the
aggrieved U.S. parties in trade cases expect our
partners to take seriously the outcomes of the
dispute settlement process, then by all means
the United States should take seriously and act
expeditiously to comply with dispute settle-
ment outcomes requiring changes in U.S. poli-
cies. Presently, the United States remains out of
compliance with several Appellate Body deci-
sions regarding various technical anti-dumping
procedures and agricultural policies. Congress
also recently reauthorized a farm bill contain-
ing provisions that have been ruled WTO-
inconsistent. 
If we are to ignore WTO rules and dispute
settlement outcomes, how can we legitimately
expect our trade partners to behave any differ-
ently? American constituencies cannot expect
their complaints about violations and lax en-
forcement to fall on sympathetic ears while the
U.S. government continues to be remiss in its
own compliance. They should only expect simi-
lar behavior from our trade partners. And if more
and more WTO members choose to ignore the
outcomes of dispute settlement, the system will
cease to function properly and the rules-based
system of trade could fall into disrepair.
4. Adopt a China Policy of Carrots and Sticks.
Of course the elephant in the room is China.
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The success of the Obama administration’s
approach to trade relations with China is like-
ly to set the tone for overall trade policy for the
next four years. It is important that the Obama
administration appreciate the complementary
nature of the U.S.-China trade and economic
relationship so that it is not baited into an
unnecessarily confrontational stance. The pres-
ident should continue to push China to open
more of its markets faster and wider. But that
objective would best be served by avoiding fire-
works-prone exchanges through the media. 
In that regard, President Obama should
continue the tradition established by his prede-
cessor of engaging in quiet dialogue where
issues can be defused or resolved in that man-
ner, and to resort to the WTO dispute settle-
ment system only when the situation and facts
support doing so. 
President Obama should also consider that
the public U.S.-China dialogue during the past
few years—the tenor of which was set by a
Congress that was in perpetual protest of the
Bush administration’s China tack—has been
more of a litany of U.S. gripes than a dialogue.
Demands that China stop dumping, stop sub-
sidizing, stop manipulating the currency, stop
stealing intellectual property, and stop engag-
ing in unfair labor practices came to character-
ize the dialogue. Some of the allegations have
merit; some are exaggerated; others are fabrica-
tions. But most policymakers would be hard
pressed to recite any of the Chinese govern-
ment’s requests of the United States.
The time has come to seriously consider car-
rots and not just sticks—particularly since the
pain from the sticks is not limited to its intended
targets, but is felt in the United States and in
other countries, given the transnational nature of
supply chains. President Obama would invigo-
rate the relationship if he were to grant China
“market economy” treatment in anti-dumping
cases.While such a reform would take very little
out of petitioning industries’ hides, the gesture
would win vast sums of goodwill from the
Chinese—goodwill needed to resolve more
important issues going forward. Indeed, repeal of
the non-market economy (NME) designation
presents a “win-win” scenario for several reasons.
First, graduation from NME status is one
of the Chinese government’s top international
trade priorities. China wants to be treated like
all other major economies, and accordingly, the
Chinese government is likely willing to make
important concessions in other contested areas
of trade policy to achieve market economy sta-
tus. But the longer we wait to grant market
economy status to China, the less valuable that
concession becomes. Under the rules governing
China’s accession to the WTO, the United
States must repeal China’s NME designation
by 2016. Thus, the value of that “concession”
will be greater in 2009—seven years early—
than it will be in 2010 or 2012. Much beyond
2012, and the concession looks a bit like
Confederate money.
Second, China’s NME designation has
drawn intense criticism from domestic consum-
ing industries, trade policy experts, and U.S.
trade partners because of its incongruous appli-
cation (for example, Russia was deemed a “mar-
ket economy” in 2002, yet still is not a WTO
member, while China became a WTO member
in 2001) and the latitude for abuse of adminis-
trative discretion it affords.95 Also, the relatively
recent change in policy that opened the door to
countervailing duty cases against China has
sparked controversy about whether NME treat-
ment in anti-dumping cases should still be per-
missible. U.S. revocation of China’s NME status
would alleviate many of those domestic con-
cerns at virtually no cost to domestic petitioning
industries, but petitioners value NME because
of the trade-suppressing uncertainty the process
engenders.
It is important that President Obama under-
stand that our trade relationship with China has
been mutually beneficial, that the rhetoric about
the impact of unfair Chinese practices has been
highly exaggerated, and that unnecessary provo-
cation could open a Pandora’s Box of economic
problems.
5. Craft a Proactive Agenda for Implementa-
tion When Trade Consensus Reemerges. Finally,
after a year or two of reconsidering the impor-
tance of trade, consolidating gains, and demon-
strating how trade benefits the country as a
whole, the administration should contemplate
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the next steps for U.S. trade policy. When the
United States is ready to reembrace a liberal trade
agenda, policymakers will need to consider fur-
ther unilateral measures, as well as the viability of
pursuing the Doha round, some other multilat-
eral trade round, or individual bilateral agree-
ments. But for now, President Obama’s trade
policy should focus on restoring the pro-trade
consensus.
Conclusion
Trade has been a crucial component of U.S.
and world economic growth for over six
decades. But during the past decade—and par-
ticularly in the last few years—trade policy has
become partisan, rancorous, and divisive. That
divisiveness has encouraged myth making, tale
telling, and fear mongering, all of which has
undermined Americans’ confidence that they
can survive—and indeed, thrive—in the global
economy. In the process, important facts about
the benefits of trade have been lost beneath
mountains of misconceptions and fears.
Still, there is a potential silver lining in these
dark clouds. Despite all of the rhetoric, despite
the occasional ill will, and despite the piles of
anti-trade legislation introduced in the last
Congress, not a single provocative trade measure
was passed into law during the 110th Congress.
Some would argue that the presence of a
Republican president and the absence of both a
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a
veto-proof majority in Congress explain the lack
of action, and that the 111th Congress will pro-
duce nasty trade fireworks. That’s quite possible.
But there is also this more hopeful interpre-
tation: the leadership in Congress is mindful of
the adverse ramifications of punitive, unilateral
trade actions; does not really believe the anti-
trade rhetoric it has proffered to change the
terms of debate; realizes that trade barriers are
regressive taxes; wishes to honor America’s com-
mitment to the rules-based system of trade; and
does, in fact, recognize the importance of trade
to the U.S. and global economies. And it will be
more willing to work with a Democratic presi-
dent—or just a new president.
If the more optimistic interpretation is the
right one, then there is hope that the pro-trade
consensus can be restored under the Obama
administration. For that to happen, the congres-
sional leadership will need to afford President
Obama the opportunity to start repairing the
damage and to begin changing minds about
trade within Congress and across the country.
President Obama is in a unique position to rise
above parochial interests and the partisan fray
and really speak to the broader national interest.
In so doing, he should dispel the persistent
myths that have damaged Americans’ perspec-
tives on trade and summon the wide variety of
facts that strongly support a policy of U.S. inter-
national commercial engagement.
The President’s success at restoring the pro-
trade consensus will build a strong foundation
for future prosperity. It will foster economic
growth and rising living standards at home and
abroad, particularly among those most adversely
affected by trade barriers. It will engender good-
will among nations and augment a resurgent
American multilateralism. It will help reestab-
lish U.S. leadership in the global economy and
thwart growing protectionist sentiment around
the world. And it will serve as a testament to
America’s dedication to, and belief in, the indis-
pensability of liberty and free markets during a
period in our history that desperately needs such
an example. 
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